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1 Introduction
Why do wages differ across jobs? There is ample empirical evidence that worker skill and firm
productivity heterogeneity are both important contributors to observed wage dispersion, see e.g.
Abowd et al. (1999). As argued in Burdett and Judd (1983) and Burdett and Mortensen (1998),
labor market friction provides a separate source of wage dispersion and allows firm heterogeneity
to manifest itself in wages. Postel-Vinay and Robin (2002) and Cahuc et al. (2006) show that these
effects are of first order importance.
The matched employer-employee data used in studies such as these also reveal that labor mar-
kets are characterized by a large amount of worker reallocation, much of which happens through
job-to-job transitions. Reallocation of labor between firms is a costly but also productivity enhanc-
ing activity which in a decentralized economy is guided by wages. Indeed, job-to-job transitions
tend to be in the direction of higher wages and more productive matches.1 Therefore, the study of
wage dispersion should contain an understanding of the allocation of workers to firms and how the
allocation is obtained. In particular, this includes the issue of labor market sorting.
We quantify the sources of wage dispersion in an equilibrium on-the-job search model with
firm and worker heterogeneity and the possibility of sorting as workers respond to skill dependent
variation in incentives to reallocate to more productive matches. Heterogeneity is single dimen-
sional. Workers differ by skill, firms by productivity. Sorting is driven by complementarities in
the match level production technology that combines worker skill and firm productivity. Wages are
set as in Dey and Flinn (2005) and Cahuc et al. (2006). A worker’s current wage depends on her
skill level, her employer’s productivity as well as her bargaining position. The latter is shorthand
for the competition that arises between two firms when a currently employed worker meets another
firm. Meetings are chance events, and individual bargaining positions, and therefore wages, evolve
stochastically, even among identical workers employed in identical firms. The model delivers a
structural log wage variance decomposition with four components: Worker and firm heterogeneity,
frictional competition (defined as within-match bargaining position variation), and sorting.
Using Danish matched employer-employee data we find evidence of positive sorting in the la-
bor market. The estimated equilibrium allocation of workers to firms implies a correlation between
worker skill and firm productivity of 0.37. Sorting is the single biggest contributor to wage disper-
sion, with 40% of the variance in log wages attributed to the positive association between worker
1See for example Fallick and Fleischman (2001), Christensen et al. (2005), Nagypál (2005) and Jolivet et al. (2006).
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skill and firm productivity. By themselves, worker and firm heterogeneity contribute 30% and 20%,
respectively. Finally, frictional competition for workers’ services in the labor market contributes
10%. We find that the decentralized economy is slightly over-sorted relative to that of the social
planner who can improve output net of search cost by 1.4%.2
Three quarters of the contribution from sorting is due to a positive within-firm covariance be-
tween worker skill and the worker’s bargaining position. That is, more skilled workers extract a
greater share of rents from given matches. With this, the analysis provides a reconciliation be-
tween our results and those in Abowd et al. (1999) and Postel-Vinay and Robin (2002). The former
finds that wage dispersion is predominantly explained through worker wage fixed effect variation,
whereas the latter finds a much smaller contribution from worker heterogeneity and a large con-
tribution from frictional wage dispersion. Our estimate implies roughly the same amount of wage
variance from bargaining position variation as in Postel-Vinay and Robin (2002). As such, we
agree that a large portion of wage variance is from this channel. However, allowing for sorting in
the analysis reveals that a significant part of it is correlated with worker skill which we classify as a
sorting contribution. Abowd et al. (1999) has no explicit notion of bargaining position variation. If
we attribute the positive within-firm covariance between worker skill and the worker’s bargaining
position to the worker variance contribution, we obtain a variance decomposition similar to that of
Abowd et al. (1999). With this interpretation, a more skilled worker has a high wage fixed effect
not just because she is more productive but also because she extracts a greater share of rents.
The correlation between worker and firm wage fixed effects as obtained in an Abowd et al.
(1999) log wage regression is essentially zero in the Danish data. It is notable that despite the true
correlation of 0.37 between worker skill and firm productivity in our estimatedmodel, it reproduces
a worker and firm wage fixed effects correlation that is close to the zero correlation in the data. We
understand this as a discrepancy between the true wage process in the model and that implied by
the Abowd et al. (1999) specification. For example, the wage function in the estimated model is not
monotone in theworker and firm types.3 As demonstrated in AppendixC, and as also emphasized in
Eeckhout and Kircher (2011), Lise et al. (2016), and Lopes deMelo (2016), the correlation between
the Abowd et al. (1999) wage fixed effects may in this case provide a significantly downward biased
2In the interest of comparison with studies such as Gautier and Teulings (2012) that study the output gain in the
absence of frictions for fixed job and worker populations, our estimated economy obtains an 8.1% output improvement
for a perfectly sorted allocation of the model’s estimated worker and job populations.
3The production function is assumed monotonically increasing in each index. The non-monotonicity is a result of
sorting in a frictional environment.
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estimate of the true match distribution correlation between skill and productivity.
As in the partnership models of Becker (1973) and Shimer and Smith (2000), our analysis links
sorting in the match distribution to match production function complementarities, but sorting ob-
tains through a different mechanism. In our setup, due to an assumption of constant returns to
scale in production, as well as workers’ opportunity to search on the job, neither firms nor workers
view the match formation decision to include a search opportunity loss. In contrast, the accep-
tance/rejection decision that drives assortative matching in Shimer and Smith (2000) relies on a
fundamental scarcity: Once matched, the agent gives up the opportunity to search until once again
unmatched. This is not an altogether unreasonable assumption in the study of marriage, as in Becker
(1973), but the vital role of on the job search and the fact that a single firm can match with many
workers as well as possibly engage in replacement hiring make the scarcity assumption in labor
market matching less obvious.4
We follow Burdett (1978) and let workers choose how intensely to search for outside job oppor-
tunities. Christensen et al. (2005) show that match distributions in the Danish matched employer-
employee data imply that workers reduce search intensity as they move up the firm ladder. Mueller
(2010) finds direct evidence in support of this conclusion based on the American Time Use Survey
where workers are observed to reduce search intensity given higher wages. Given complemen-
tarities in the production function between worker skill and firm productivity, the workers’ search
intensity choices vary with skill. Positive complementarities in production induce more skilled
workers to search more intensely to move up the firm hierarchy. In this case more skilled work-
ers will stochastically be matched with more productive firms, and positive assortative matching
obtains. Negative complementarities in production result in negative assortative matching.5
Identification of sorting, that is, recovering from observed data the relationship between (pos-
sibly unobserved) worker skill and firm productivity, is inherently difficult and is a central question
in the paper.6 The identification strategy in the paper is focused on the mobility part of the data.
Firm type rank is identified by revealed preference based on the fraction of a firm’s hires that comes
4In flexible frameworks that can in principle reveal worker type dependent firm ladders, recent work by Bonhomme
et al. (2016), Haltiwanger et al. (2016), and Lentz et al. (2016) have yet to find evidence of disagreement across worker
types about firm ranks. It is a key feature of sorting in the partnership model that there is disagreement across worker
types about the ranking of firms.
5 The core sorting mechanism in the model is analyzed in detail in Lentz (2010).
6In this respect, it is joined by Gautier and Teulings (2006), Eeckhout and Kircher (2011), Lise et al. (2016), Lopes
de Melo (2016), and more recently by Bartolucci and Devicienti (2015) and Hagedorn et al. (2016), all of which argue
identification by the adoption of the partnership model assumptions of match opportunity scarcity. These identification
strategies are not valid in our setting.
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directly from other firms as opposed to from unemployment: The poaching index. With this, iden-
tification is obtained through firm rank conditional mobility and wage patterns. We treat worker
skill as unobserved but we demonstrate in Section 4 that the data are characterized by positive sort-
ing between firm rank and worker education length. In addition, we also find that better educated
workers have shorter unemployment durations pointing to the central mechanism in the paper, that
more skilled workers search away from poor matches faster.
The paper is structured as follows: The model is presented in section 2. Sections 3, 4 and 5
present data, key identification arguments and model estimation and fit. Section 6 discusses the
implied estimate for efficiency loss due to mismatch and in section 7 we decompose the estimated
wage variance into its four distinct sources; worker heterogeneity, firm heterogeneity, imperfect
labor market competition, and sorting, and discusses the decomposition in relation to the Abowd
et al. (1999) and Postel-Vinay and Robin (2002) contributions. Section 8 concludes.
2 Model
2.1 Production and search technologies
There is a continuum of firms with measurem, and a continuum of risk neutral workers with mea-
sure normalized at unity. Time is continuous and firms and workers discount time at a common
rate r. Workers maximize income and firms maximize profits. A worker is characterized by his or
her permanent innate skill level h ∈ [0, 1] which is independently and identically distributed across
workers according to the cumulative distribution function Ψ(·). Firms differ with respect to their
permanent productivity p ∈ [0, 1] which is independently and identically distributed across firms
according to the cumulative distribution function Φ(·).
Workers can be either employed or unemployed. Regardless of employment state, a worker
generates job offers through a choice of search intensity s at increasing and convex cost c(s). A
job offer is a draw of a firm productivity from the vacancy distribution Γ(·) with pdf γ(·). The
efficiency of the search technology may differ between employment states. A search intensity s
results in an arrival rate of new job opportunities of (µ + κs)λ(θ) if unemployed and sλ(θ) if
employed, where κ > 0. If κ > 1 then search is more efficient in the unemployed state. µ ≥ 0
represents arrival of offers that is unrelated to the search decision of the worker, normalized by
λ(θ). λ(θ) is the equilibrium arrival rate of offers per search unit and θ is the market tightness. By
assumption λ′(θ) ≥ 0. We will often suppress θ in the expression for λ(θ).
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A match between a worker of skill level h and a firm of productivity p produces output f(h, p).
It is assumed that f(h, p) is twice continuously differentiable with fp(h, p) ≥ 0 and fh(h, p) ≥ 0 for
all (h, p). Hence, more skilled workers enjoy an absolute advantage relative to less skilled workers
regardless of the firm type p they are matched with. Likewise for the ranking of firms. We do not
restrict the modularity of the production technology. That is, the sign of the cross partial derivative
fhp(h, p) is unrestricted. Firms operate at constant returns to scale at the match level. Hence, a
firm’s output is the sum of the match outputs.
Match separation occurs as the result of one of three mutually exclusive events. First, the worker
may receive an offer from an outside firm with greater productivity than the current firm. As we
shall see, this will induce a quit. Second, the worker receives an advance notice layoff shock at
rate δ0, normalized by λ (θ). Given the advance notice the worker searches for a new job with
the now lower value of the current job. Workers in higher value jobs have a higher reservation
threshold and their new job is in expectation a result of more draws from the offer distribution. We
adopt a modeling simplification whereby an advance notice layoff shock simply results in a move to
another job that is the best offer from n(p) draws from the offer distribution, where n(p) is assumed
weakly increasing in p.7 Furthermore, let the number of draws at the bottom of the firm hierarchy be
n(0) = 1, reflecting that any new job dominates this job conditional on the worker holding the job
in the first place. The special case where n(p) = 1 for all p ∈ [0, 1] corresponds to the exogenous
reallocation shock in Jolivet et al. (2006).8 Third, at rate δ(p) the worker is immediately laid off
and moves into unemployment. The layoff rate is allowed to depend on the firm type in such a way
that more valuable jobs are less prone to destruction. That is, δ(p) is assumed weakly decreasing
in p. In the remainder of the paper, it is assumed that µ = δ0.
2.2 Bargaining and employment contracts.
An employment contract consists of a wage and a search intensity, (w, s), which are fixed until both
parties agree to renegotiate. The analysis assumes search intensities can be contracted upon, which
results in the implementation of the jointly (between employer and employee) efficient search in-
7A related interpretation may be that jobs are subject to idiosyncratic productivity shocks where the distribution
of the new productivity draw is stochastically increasing in the current productivity of the match. Either way, a full
modeling of the process involves taking a stand on the wage process during the advance notice period or its dependence
on idiosyncratic productivity shocks.
8Also referred to as the “Godfather shock”, as in an offer that cannot be refused.
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tensity level, a useful benchmark.9 The outcome of the employment contract bargaining is such that
the agreed upon search intensity maximizes the joint surplus of the match and the wage dictates the
surplus split. When unmatched the worker searches so as to maximize the value of unemployment.
Contracts, renegotiated by mutual consent only, are set through a Rubinstein (1982) style bar-
gaining game as in Cahuc et al. (2006). It is assumed that the worker can use a contact with one
employer as a threat point in a bargaining game with another. The bargaining procedure is observa-
tionally equivalent to the one in Dey and Flinn (2005), which is generalized Nash bargaining with
worker bargaining power β. If two firms compete over a worker, the worker moves to, or is retained
by, the more productive firm, as the case may be. The worker bargains with full surplus extraction
at the less productive firm as the outside option. If the worker is unemployed, then the value of
unemployment will be the worker’s outside option.
Denote by V (h, p) the joint net present value of match to the worker and the firm where the
search intensity s(h, p) is chosen optimally to maximize this object. If a worker is bargaining with
a type p firm given an outside option of full surplus extraction from a type q ≤ p firm, the outcome
gives the worker a net present value of,
V (h, q, p) = βV (h, p) + (1− β)V (h, q), (1)
where the wage flow w(h, q, p) is set so as to achieve the value split.
2.3 Employment contract
The joint value to the firm and the worker from a match can be written as,
(
r + δ(p) + λδ0
)
V (h, p) = max
s≥0
[
f(h, p)− c(s) + λsβ
∫ 1
p
[
V (h, p′)− V (h, p)]dΓ(p′)+
(
δ(p) + λδ0
)
V0(h) + λδ0β
∫ 1
R(h)
[
V (h, p′)− V0(h)
]
dΓ(p′)n(p)
]
, (2)
where V0(h) is the worker’s valuation of unemployment andR(h) is the worker’s reservation thresh-
old defined by V (h,R(h)) = V0(h). Net of search cost, the match generates output flow f(h, p)−
c(s). At rate λs the worker in the match meets an outside firm p′, which in case V (h, p′) > V (h, p)
yields net value of V (h, p, p′)− V (h, p), and otherwise zero. At rate δ(p) the match ends in which
9Lentz (2014) studies the mechanism design problem in the case where search intensity is not contractable. Here, a
flat wage profile that does not deliver the entire surplus to the worker results in the worker searching too much relative
to the jointly efficient level because part of the incentive to generate outside offers now includes rent extraction from
the current match.
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case the worker moves to unemployment. The advance notice shock also gives the worker a draw
from the CDF Γ(·)n(p), which is accepted if it exceeds the workers reservation threshold,R(h). The
offer acceptance threshold formulation relies on V (h, p) being monotonically increasing in p. This
follows from f(h, p) and n(p) increasing in p and the positive slope is amplified by δ(p) weakly
decreasing in p. It is furthermore straightforward to show that there exists a unique solution to the
value function. We provide a proof in the appendix. The worker’s valuation of unemployment can
be written as,
rV0(h) = max
s≥0
[
f(h, 0)− c(s) + (µ+ κs)λβ
∫ 1
R(h)
[
V (h, p′)− V0(h)
]
dΓ(p′)
]
. (3)
A type-h worker’s valuation of a contract with a type p firm, characterized by a wagew(h, q, p)
and search intensity s(h, p) can be written recursively by,
(
r+δ(p)+λδ0+λs(h, p)Γˆ(q)
)
V (h, q, p) = w(h, q, p)−c(s(h, p))+λs(h, p) ∫ 1
p
V (h, p, p′)dΓ(p′)
+ λs(h, p)
∫ p
q
V (h, p′, p)dΓ(p′) +
(
δ(p) + λδ0
)
V0(h)
+ λδ0β
∫ 1
R(h)
[V (h, p′)− V0(h)] dΓ(p′)n(p), (4)
where Γˆ(·) = 1 − Γ(·) and q represents the worker’s bargaining position in the sense of equation
(1), that is, full surplus extraction with a type-q firm. If the worker meets a firm of type p′ > p, the
worker leaves and receives a contract with the new firm that yields value V (h, p, p′). If the worker
meets an outside firm that would be willing to offer greater value than the worker’s current contract
but cannot offer more than the worker’s current firm, the contract is renegotiated and the worker
stays. This happens if q ≤ p′ ≤ p in which case the worker receives a new contract with value
V (h, p′, p). The layoff and advance notice shocks contribute to the worker’s contract valuation in
ways identical to those in equation (2). Together, equations (1)-(4) determine w(h, q, p).
The optimal search intensity in an (h, p)-match satisfies the first order condition,
c′
(
s(h, p)
)
= λβ
∫ 1
p
Vp(h, p
′)dΓˆ(p′), (5)
where the right hand side represents the expected rents extracted from outside employers from an
additional unit of search. Similarly, an unemployed worker chooses search intensity s0(h) that
solves,
c′
(
s0(h)
)
= κλβ
∫ 1
R(h)
Vp(h, p
′)dΓˆ(p′). (6)
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It follows directly from the first order condition (5) that s(h, p) is decreasing in p.
In a simpler model where layoff and advance notice shocks do not depend on firm type, Lentz
(2010) links variation in search intensity across worker skill to production function complemen-
tarities. Specifically, if the production is modular, fhp(h, p) = 0, then search intensity is invariant
in skill for a given firm type, sh(h, p) = 0. If the production is globally super (sub) modular then
search intensity is increasing (decreasing) in worker skill, that is sh(h, p)fhp(h, p) ≥ 0.We numer-
ically verify that our model solution has the same property in our setting with firm type dependent
layoff rates and advance notice shocks.
The reservation productivity R(h) is defined by,
V (h,R(h)) = V0(h). (7)
It is straightforward to show that R(h) = 0 if κ < 1, which turns out to be the relevant case
for the estimated model. The reservation productivity level is non-trivial if unemployed search is
more efficient than employed search, κ > 1, where one obtains that R(h) > 0. However, in the
case where the production function is modular, it is straightforward to verify that the reservation
threshold is invariant in worker skill.
2.4 Steady state worker flows
Denote by g(p|h) the fraction of employed skill-h workers that are matched with productivity-
p firms (by definition,
∫ 1
0
g(p|h)dp = 1). Denote by eh the fraction of skill-h workers that are
employed. In steady state, the flow into the stock ehg(p|h)must equal the flow out, which translates
to the condition,
g˜(h, p) =
γ(p)
[
1 +
∫ p
0
s(h, p′)g˜(h, p′)dp′ + δ0
∫ 1
0
n(p′)Γ(p)n(p
′)−1g˜(h, p′)dp′
]
δ0 + δˆ(p) + s(h, p)Γ̂(p)
, (8)
where δˆ(p) = δ(p)/λ and,
g(p|h) =
[
1− eh
eh
(
κs0(h) + µ
)]
g˜(h, p), (9)
and
eh =
(
κs0(h) + µ
) ∫ 1
0
g˜(h, p)dp
1 +
(
κs0(h) + µ
) ∫ 1
0
g˜(h, p)dp
. (10)
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Equation (8) provides a self-contained equation system for the solution of g˜(h, p), which then di-
rectly provides eh and subsequently g(p|h).
Furthermore, define g(q, p|h) as the fraction of skill-hworkers that arematchedwith productivity-
p firms with a bargaining position of q. With the solution for g(p|h) in hand, the steady state con-
dition on g(q, p|h) can, for q > 0, be written as,
g(q, p|h) = s(h, q)γ(p)g(q|h) + s(h, p)γ(q)
∫ q
0
g(q′, p|h)dq′
δ0 + δˆ(p) + s(h, p)Γ̂(q)
(11)
and, for q = 0,
g(0, p|h) =
1
[
R(h) ≤ p]γ(p) [1−eh
eh
(s0 (h) + µ) + δ0
∫ 1
0
n(p′)Γ(p)n(p
′)−1g(p′|h)dp′
]
δ0 + δˆ(p) + s(h, p)
. (12)
2.5 Recruitment intensity
Firms are modeled as constant returns to scale technologies, each with a single hiring operation
where hiring intensity ν is chosen at convex vacancy cost, χ (ν). The output of the firm is the sum
of the outputs of each of its matches. The firm meets a worker at rate η (θ) ν, where η (θ) is the
equilibrium meeting rate of a vacancy. The value of the hiring operation in a type p firm is given
by,
J(p) = max
ν
[
−χ(ν) + ην(1− β)
∫ 1
0
[
1
[
R(h) ≤ p] [ηu(h) + η0(h, p)] [V (h, p)− V0(h)]
+
∫ p
R(h)
ηe(h, p′) [V (h, p)− V (h, p′)] dp′
]
dh
]
,
where ηu (h) the probability that a meeting is with an unemployed skill-h worker. η0(h, p) is the
probability that a meeting is with a skill-h worker coming from an advance notice layoff, and who
is willing to match with the firm. Finally, ηe (h, p′) is the probability that a meeting is with a skill-h
worker currently employed with a type-p′ firm. They are defined by,
ηu(h, p) =
ψh(1− eh)
(
κs0(h) + µ
)
s
,
η0(h, p) =
ψhehδ0
∫ 1
0
n(p′)Γ(p)n(p
′)−1g(p′|h)dp′
s
,
ηe(h, p) =
ψhehs(h, p)g(p|h)
s
,
where total worker search, s, is defined by,
s =
∫ 1
0
[
(1− eh)
(
κs0 (h) + µ
)
+ eh
∫ 1
0
(
s(h, p′) + δ0n(p
′)
)
g(p′|h)dp′
]
ψ(h′)dh′. (13)
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Thus, the optimal vacancy intensity for a type-p firm satisfies the first order condition,
χ′(ν(p)) = η(1− β)
∫ 1
0
[
1
[
R(h) ≤ p] [ηu(h) + η0(h, p)] [V (h, p)− V0(h)]
+
∫ p
R(h)
ηe (h, q) [V (h, p)− V (h, q)] dq
]
dh.
It is straightforward to show that hiring intensity ν(p) is increasing in firm productivity since both
match value and the acceptance rates are increasing in firm productivity.
2.6 Steady state equilibrium
The sampling distribution from the vacancy pool is the recruitment intensity weighted firm type
distribution,
Γ(p) =
∫ p
0
ν(p′)dΦ(p′)∫ 1
0
ν(p′)dΦ(p′)
. (14)
In equilibrium, the meeting rates of workers and firms must balance which implies λ(θ) = θη(θ),
where, by proportional matching,
θ =
m
∫ 1
0
ν(p′)dΦ(p′)
s
, (15)
where s is the total amount of search as defined in equation (13).
With these conditions, the steady state equilibrium can be defined by,
Definition 1. A steady state equilibrium is a collection
{
s(h, p), s0(h), R(h), g(p|h), e,Γ(p), θ
}
that satisfies equations (5), (6), (7), (8), (10), (14), and (15).
2.7 Steady state equilibrium sorting
The steady state equilibriummay or may not display sorting depending on the characteristics of the
production function. Our notion of sorting is focused on how worker skill and firm productivity are
allocated in steady state equilibrium. We restrict attention to production functionswheremodularity
is global. First, define the worker type conditional CDF of firm types by,
Ω(p|h) =
∫ p
0
g(p′|h)dp′∫ 1
0
g(p′|h)dp′ . (16)
Given that search intensity is increasing (decreasing) in worker skill for a supermodular (submodu-
lar) production function, following the same logic as in Lentz (2010), the equilibrium is character-
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ized by a strong type of sorting result: For κ ≤ 1, Ω(p|h) is stochastically increasing (decreasing)
in h if and only if the production function is supermodular (submodular).10
The firms in our model are multi-worker constant returns to scale firms. Hiring a worker at a
given point in time does not preclude future recruitment, so firms are non-discriminatory in hiring.
The worker’s job acceptance strategy is similarly trivial in a model where employed search is no
less efficient than unemployed search. In this case, workers accept any match regardless of firm
productivity as long as it is better than the current match.
When the production function is supermodular, more skilled workers have greater gains to up-
ward movement on the firm ladder, and acting on their incentives they consequently search more
intensely. Since downward movement on the ladder is skill independent, more skilled workers
will—in a stochastic dominance sense—be matched with better firms. In the submodular case, it
is the low skill workers that have larger relative gains to upward movement, and so, the low skilled
workers search more intensely and end up higher on the firm ladder.
The result generalizes to any κ > 0 as long as R(h) is increasing (decreasing) in worker
skill when the production function is supermodular (submodular). The last qualification is non-
trivial. As demonstrated in Shimer and Smith (2000) simple super- or submodularity does not
necessarily dictate positive or negative assortative matching (PAM or NAM) through the match ac-
ceptance/rejection decision channel. Our model is subject to the same complications. As it turns
out, our model estimate implies κ < 1, and as such, the reservation level is trivially R(h) = 0 for
all skill levels.
2.8 Wages
Together, equations (1)-(4) determine the wage function w(h, q, p). We provide an analytical ex-
pression and interpretation in Appendix D. The worker’s current valuation of a match includes an
expectation of increasing match value throughout the current employment spell. This is true both
within and between jobs in the given employment spell.11 In particular, total joint match value is
increasing in firm type and competition implies that the worker is moving in the direction of ex-
tracting this value. In isolation, it implies that the current wage is decreasing in firm type for a given
current worker match value, which is why wages may fall as the worker moves between employers.
10As in Lentz (2010), the proof (available upon request) establishes the relationship between sh (h, p) and the worker
skill conditional steady state match distribution.
11An employment spell is defined as a period of unbroken employment between two unemployment spells, which
can include several employers.
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Figure 1: Non-monotone wages
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Skill conditional wage, E (w (h, q, p) |h, p)
Productivity (p)
h(90)
h(50)
h(10)
Note: The example assumes δ(p) = δ and n(p) = 1 and the parameterization, (c0, c1, ρ, f0, α, β, κ, δ, δ0) =
(0.01, 1,−7, 5, 0.5, 0.1, 1, 0.1, 0.05). In addition, the vacancy and worker skill distributions are assumed
uniform. h(x) indicates the xth percentile in the worker skill distributionΨ(h).
In general, the expected growth rate of match value depends on both worker and firm type. It
depends on worker type through the worker’s search intensity, which dictates the arrival of outside
competition. The firm type enters through this channel as well. In addition, the firm type enters
through the layoff rate and the advance notice shock. A decreasing layoff rate in firm type will tend
to amplify the wage mechanics as described above in that worker match value growth in low type
firms is discounted more heavily than match value growth in high type firms.
Wages are not necessarilymonotone in firm type p. This is awell known feature of the sequential
bargaining model as in Postel-Vinay and Robin (2002) and Cahuc et al. (2006). As it turns out,
wages are also not necessarily monotone in the worker skill index, either. Figure 1 illustrates the
average wage steady state wage for an (h, p)match, E
[
w(h, q, p) | h, p], where model specification
is given in detail in Section 5.1 and parameterization is given in the figure note.
Figure 1 draws the wage as a function of p for the 10th, 50th, and 90th worker skill percentile,
denoted h(10), h(50) and h(90). In the example, the production function is supermodular and the
worker’s bargaining power, β, is relatively low. The example shows that it is possible that worker
skill conditional wagesmay be decreasing in firm type for parts of the firm productivity support. For
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a given wage, a more productive firm is more valuable to a worker because it offers the possibility
of more rent extraction in the event of future outside offers. Hence, for a given bargaining position,
negotiations with a more productive firm results in an initially lower wage. However, the realization
of future higher wages may tend to take place with an even more productive firm, making it possible
that some firms pay lower wages on average than their less productive peers. This is a feature of the
wage determination mechanism that does not rely on the modularity of the production function.
Figure 1 also illustrates that it is possible that firm productivity conditional wages may be de-
creasing in worker type (see for example the 20th percentile firm type in the example). This com-
plete reversal of the ranking of workers by wages stems from supermodularity. The more skilled
worker is expecting greater future wage gains relative to a less skilled worker, an effect that is am-
plified by the greater search effort among more skilled workers when production is supermodular.
Consequently, for identical outside options the current wage is lower for the more skilled workers.
Using wages across workers within a given firm to identify worker types is further complicated by
the possibility that workers outside option q may vary systematically with worker skill type. In par-
ticular, in the case of a submodular production technology, low type workers search more intensely
and accumulate a better bargaining position. Low skill workers may thus end up with higher wages
within a firm.
We emphasize the non-monotonicity of the wage function in the underlying productivity indices
because it complicates the worker and firm type classification identification which cannot be done
by wages alone. In particular, it takes off the table the otherwise obvious approach of using the wage
fixed effect rankings that result from an Abowd et al. (1999) wage decomposition. It also eliminates
the identification strategies in Hagedorn et al. (2016) and Bartolucci and Devicienti (2015) where
worker classification is obtained subject to wages being monotonically increasing in worker type
within firms.
3 Data
Our empirical analysis is conducted usingDanish administrativematched employer-employee (MEE)
data. The backbone of our data is a population-wide dataset on individual labor market histories
recorded at a weekly frequency during 1985-2003. The data comprises information on virtually all
individuals residing legally in Denmark aged 15-70. Workers and firms are identified via unique
IDs. Individual labor market spells are constructed from administrative registers with information
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on public transfers, hourly wages, and start and end dates for all jobs reported by employers to tax
authorities, and mandatory employer pension contributions.
The raw data identify five labor market states: employment (jobs), unemployment, retirement,
self-employment and non-participation. By construction, non-participation is a residual state re-
flecting that an individual is neither employed nor self-employed nor receiving any kind of public
transfer that would categorize him/her as unemployed or retired. Hence, in addition to genuine
out-of-the-labor-force spells, non-participation captures imperfect take-up rates of public transfers,
reception of transfers not used in the construction of the spell data and misreported start and end
dates of spells.
Using person and firm IDs we merge the spells data with information on individual education
andwages, and firm’s sector of operation from IDA (Integreret Database for Arbejdsmarkedsforskn-
ing), an annual population-wide (age 15-70) Danish MEE panel constructed and maintained by
Statistics Denmark from several administrative registers. Our wage measure is an estimate of the
average hourly wage for jobs that are active in the last week of November. No wage information is
available for job spells that do not overlap with a last week of November.12
A number of selection criteria and data manipulations are imposed in order to rid the data of
invalid observations and to reduce un-modeled heterogeneity as well as other features of the data
that our model is not designed to deal with. First, we truncate individual labor market histories at
age 55 and discard any labor market history that predates labor market entry as measured by date
of graduation from highest completed education. Second, we discard all workers ever observed in
employment in the public sector, in self-employment, in retirement, or in the agricultural industry.
Third, we recode non-participation spells as unemployment spells.13 We recode unemployment
spells with duration no greater than 13 weeks followed by recall of the worker back to the same
employer as part of the original employment spell. In addition, we recode unemployment spells
of duration two weeks or less in between two employment spells with different employers as a
transition between two job spells within a single employment spell. Fourth, We select the period
12In addition, we have information on value added per worker from a subset of firms for the period 1995-2003. This
information is obtained from an annual accounting data survey conducted by Statistics Denmark, see Bagger et al.
(2014) for further description of this data. We merge value added information onto the labor market history data, but
do not utilize it in the estimation. Instead we use it to document how our firm rank measure, a poaching rank to be
introduced further below, correlates with observed firm productivity.
13Our model features two labor market states and we must decide how to treat the empirical observation of non-
participation in relation to the model’s notion of unemployment. Coding non-participation as unemployment implies
we work with a broad definition of unemployment.
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Table 1: Analysis data—Summary statistics
All years 1994 2003
Number of observations 6,815,884 658,465 703,707
Number of individuals 782,951 552,869 588,643
Number of job spells 1,698,990 490,309 511,604
Number of unemployment spells 608,065 168,155 192,102
Number of firms 117,847 53,537 58,210
Number of firm-years 559,920 53,537 58,249
1994-2003 for our analysis. Our structural model assumes permanent worker and firm types. We
want to have a long enough panel to be able to effectively measure worker flows, but do not want to
push the type permanence assumption too much. Fifth, we trim the annual individual hourly wage
at the 1st and 99th percentiles, and trend them to 2003 levels.
Table 1 provides basic summary statistics on the final analysis panel and also shows statistics
for the first (1994) and last (2003) annual cross section in the data. We postpone the presentation of
further descriptive statistics to our discussion of model identification in section 4 and the analysis
of the structural model’s fit in section 5.3.
4 Identification
We estimate the model using Indirect Inference, see Gourieroux et al. (1993). This involves finding
the structural parameters that best fits a chosen set of auxiliary statistics. Identification is a question
of ensuring that there is one and only one set of structural parameters that is consistent with the
auxiliary statistics included in the estimation. In total there are 57 statistics in the auxiliary model.
In the following we describe the construction of the statistics and their role in identification.
Identification of labor market sorting requires statistics that rank workers and firms in terms of
their unobserved skills and productivities h and p. Such statistics are difficult to find. Wage data
alone does not suffice because wages are not monotone in the firm and worker productivity indices,
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see Section 2.8.14 Firm level output data does not solve the firm rank identification problem either,
as the non-monotonicity extends to labor productivity.15 Instead, we turn to worker reallocation
rate heterogeneity.
Besides the production function, there are many other aspects of our model to be identified. For
this reason—and to ensure that the estimated model explains a comprehensive set of labor market
outcomes—we include a large number of auxiliary statistics related to worker reallocation and cross
section heterogeneity in the estimation. We first describe our firm classification concept which is
based on a revealed preference argument.
4.1 The poaching rank
Our model features a firm ladder with higher rungs representing more productive firms. As noted
in Section 2.3 total match value, V (h, p), is strictly increasing in p regardless of worker skill. Fur-
thermore, match separation is efficient. Therefore, leaving aside the advance notice shock, any
job-to-job transition reflects a revealed preference over the two firms where the poaching firm must
have productivity greater than the raided firm. We use this insight to construct a poaching index
that allows identification of the productivity rank of firms.16
Firm j’s poaching index πj measures the fraction of a firm’s hires that are poached from other
firms,
πj =
NEEj
NUEj +N
EE
j
, (17)
where NUEj is the number of firm j hires from unemployment, and N
EE
j is the number of workers
firm j poached from other firms. Hence, the total number of firm j hires isNUEj +N
EE
j . In expec-
tation, a firm’s poaching index equals the hire conditional probability that the worker is poached,
14Similar conclusions are obtained by Eeckhout and Kircher (2011), Lopes de Melo (2016), and Lise et al. (2016).
The mechanisms by which non-monotonicity arise are different in theses papers relative to ours. In Appendix C we
document that wage non-monotonicity bias the correlation between worker and firm fixed effects from a log wage
regression downward relative to the correlation between h and p. Hence, our analysis suggests that the wage fixed
effects correlation provides a lower bound on the true degree of assortative matching.
15The equilibrium distribution of h conditional on p, Ωj(h|p), j ∈ {L,H}, is not necessarily stochastically increas-
ing (decreasing) in p when the production function is supermodular (submodular); see Lentz (2010). Hence, a given
firm may have a less skilled workforce than its slightly less productive competitor, implying that a ranking of firms by
labor productivity does not necessarily reflect a ranking of firms by underlying productivity p.
16Other papers that use job-to-job transitions as revealed preference are Sorkin (2015) and Taber and Vejlin (2016).
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which in steady state is given by,
π(pj) = E[πj | pj ] =
∫ 1
0
[
η0(h, pj) +
∫ pj
0
ηe(h, p′)dp′
]
dΨ(h)∫ 1
0
[
ηu(h, pj) + η0(h, pj) +
∫ pj
0
ηe(h, p′)dp′
]
dΨ(h)
, (18)
where ηx (h, p) for x ∈ {u, e, 0} is defined in Section 2.5. The denominator of equation (18) is
the probability that a meeting results in a hire and the numerator is the probability that a meeting
results in a poaching. For the case, κ ≤ 1, straightforward differentiation yields the expected
poaching index is monotonically increasing in the firm’s productivity index p. The probability that
a meeting results in a hire from unemployment is unaffected by the firm’s type (ηup (h, p) = 0),
whereas the probability that a meeting results in a poaching is increasing in the firm’s productivity,
η0p(h, p) + η
e(h, p) > 0.17
For each firm in our analysis data, we collect all hires made during the 10 year observation
window and record the share of these hires that come directly from other firms, πj . We proceed to
define the firm’s poaching rank πˆj ∈ [0, 1] as firm j’s poaching index position in the cumulative
poaching index distribution function across the firms. Given that E[π | p] is monotonically increas-
ing in p, the poaching rank is an unbiased estimate of the firm’s rank in the cumulative productivity
distribution function across the firms.
In the estimation, the poaching index is measured only for firms with a total inflow of more
than 15 hires, and at least one hire from unemployment. Thus, very small firms are assigned to
the group of firms without a rank. Given the prevalence of exogenous job-to-job reallocation in
the data, the noise in the inflow measure is considerable for very small firms and conditioning on
extreme realizations (either low or high) of the poaching index tends to select very small firms. The
poaching index is less noisy for larger firms.18
The poaching rank turns out to be closely correlated with other commonfirm rankmeasures such
as the firm’s average wage across its workers or the firm’s labor productivity, defined as its value
added per worker. In the data, the correlation between the poaching rank and the firm wage rank is
0.36. The correlation between the poaching rank and the labor productivity rank is 0.25. Figure 2
shows the relationship between the poaching rank and the wage and productivity ranks. In contrast
17In the case where κ > 1, the match acceptance decision, as represented by the productivity threshold R(h), must
be taken into account. Monotonicity does not necessarily hold in cases where R(h) varies across h. The case κ < 1
turns out to be the empirically relevant one.
18We replicate the same selection in our model simulation, as well as the average firm size in the data so as to emulate
the noise in the firm rank measure that is related to small numbers.
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Figure 2: Poaching rank conditional average wage and productivity ranks.
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Note: The firm wage is its wage bill per full time worker. Firm labor productivity is value added per full time
worker.
to both firm wage and labor productivity ranks, the poaching rank is a valid firm classification
measure given the structure in the analysis.
4.1.1 Rank conditional mobility
Given the poaching rank, we can investigate the mobility patterns of workers between firms by rank.
Specifically, we group firms by rank deciles and calculate worker mobility patterns conditional on
the rank of the current firm. The data we use for this exercise is a(n auxiliary) employment spell
flow dataset extracted from the analysis data described earlier. Specifically, we select all jobs with
non-missing poaching index initiated prior to the final year of our data period. For each job we
record duration t, indicators for the job ending in a job-to-job, respectively a job-to-nonemployment
transition, and the poaching index πˆ.
The upper, left hand panel of Figure 3 shows the origin rank conditional probability density
function of the destination firm’s poaching rank given a job-to-job transition. The graph is a contour
map and it is seen that the probability mass tend to concentrate above the diagonal. With a few
minor imperfections, we find a strong stochastic dominance result: The destination distribution is
stochastically increasing in the origin firm rank. This is exactly as one would expect in canonical on-
the-job search models such as Burdett and Mortensen (1998) and Postel-Vinay and Robin (2002).19
19In relation to the upper, left hand panel of Figure 3, it is worth noting that the standard formulation of empirical
job ladder models would struggle to explain how the destination rank distribution associated with job-to-job transitions
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The upper, right hand panel of Figure 3 shows the average rank of the destination firm conditional
on the origin firm rank. Confirming the pattern in the left hand panel, it is seen that, on average and
conditional on a job-to-job transition, workers in higher rank firms move to higher rank firms.
The lower left hand panel of Figure 3 shows the rate at which workers move directly from one
firm to another. Let dEEiτ and d
EU
iτ be binary indicators for spell i ending in a job-to-job, respectively
job-to-unemployment, transition within three months given current quarterly duration τ . We esti-
mate P̂EEτ (π) = Pr(d
EE
iτ = 1|πˆi = π) and P̂EUτ (π) = Pr(dEUiτ = 1|πˆi = π) by non-parametrically
regressing dEEiτ and d
EU
iτ on πˆi. We transform the estimated transition probabilities into hazard rates
consistent with the Poisson arrival rates in our model,
ϑEEτ (π) = −
P̂EEτ (π) ln
(
1− P̂EEτ (π)− P̂EUτ (π)
)
P̂EEτ (π) + P̂
EU
τ (π)
,
evaluated for 10 deciles in the firm ranking. The figure is a contour map and shows the EE hazard
rate conditional on both the rank of the firm and the duration of the match.
The EE hazard rate is strongly decreasing in firm rank for job durations less than a year. For
greater job durations, the relationship remains negative but is almost flat. As emphasized in Chris-
tensen et al. (2005) the canonical on-the-job search model predicts a decreasing relationship be-
tween the EE hazard and firm rank. In higher rank firms, it is less likely that an offer dominates
the current match. The search intensity choice amplifies this effect since workers search less in-
tensely for outside offers in higher rank firms. However, the canonical on-the-job search model
implies that all workers search at the same intensity within the same firm type. Consequently, the
rank conditional EE hazard is unaffected by match duration in these models, as there is no dynamic
selection on worker types. The same is true in our model when the production function is modular.
Our model interprets the relationship in Figure 3 as a result of variation in search intensity across
workers within firms, which occurs when there is sorting.
The lower, right hand panel in Figure 3 shows the first quarter layoff rate into unemployment
conditional on firm rank. It is calculated in the same way as the EE hazard. The layoff rate is
decreasing in firm rank. The model relies on the firm type conditional layoff rate to match this
relationship. As a result it is harder to escape low value labor market states, but once a worker is
out of the highest ranked firms appears to dominate those of lower ranked firms: Job-to-job transitions out of very
high ranked firms are mostly involuntary, i.e. forced by “reallocation shocks”, which suggests the destination rank
distributions from very high ranked firms resemble those of very low ranked firms. We return to this issue when we
consider identification and the estimated model’s fit, but note here that our advance notice shock specification in fact
allow us to reproduce the observed origin rank conditional destination rank distribution pattern.
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Figure 3: Job-to-job mobility patterns by poaching rank.
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in a top firm, there is substantial persistence to the state. This effect is a central feature in Jarosch
(2016). In our analysis it is included to ensure that we do not overstate the extent to which workers
can escape the lower part of the firm hierarchy through endogenous search.
Finally, in Figure 4 we show the firm poaching rank distribution over matches conditional on
the worker’s length of education. In the data, 24% of workers have less than 12 years of education.
57% have exactly 12 years of education, and 19% have more than 12 years of education. Figure
21
Figure 4: Education conditional cumulative firm rank distribution over matches.
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line is for exactly 12 years of education. Dotted line conditions on more than 12 years of
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4 shows that more educated workers are allocated to higher rank firms. Specifically, the firm rank
distribution of a better educated worker stochastically dominates that of a less educated worker.
In the estimated model, we find that Ω(p|h) is stochastically increasing in h. We treat h as unob-
served, but it is not unreasonable to expect that worker skill h and education length are positively
related. Hence, Figure 4 provides an immediate direct indication that skill and firm productivity
are positively correlated in equilibrium, consistent with our model estimate. In additional support
of the mechanism that sorting is driven by more skilled workers searching more intensely, Mueller
(2010) shows that observed search intensity is increasing in education level in the American Time
Use Survey.
4.2 Identifying labor market sorting
We construct two sets of statistics that identify the sorting patterns in the labor market. The first
exploits the shape of the firm rank conditional EE hazard rate as shown in Figure 3 where there is
less duration dependence in the EE hazard at the top of the firm hierarchy than at the bottom. Our
model explains the negative duration dependence in the firm rank conditional EE hazard function
through variation in workers’ search intensity within firm rank. With this interpretation, the data
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imply that there is greater search intensity variation in the initial pool of searchers in low rank firms
than in high rank firms. Our model naturally delivers this feature when there are complementarities
in the production function and consequently sorting. Measurement noise in the firm classifica-
tion contributes to within-firm rank search intensity heterogeneity, and therefore within-firm rank
duration dependence.20 This measurement noise is replicated in our Indirect Inference estimation
procedure and does not bias our estimates.21 Overall, the firm rank conditional EE hazards dictates
some amount of within-firm search intensity variation implying sorting in the estimated model but
it is silent about whether sorting is negative or positive.
The second auxiliary statistic related to the identification of production function modularity and
labor market sorting is based on the relationship between unemployment durations and reemploy-
ment wages in the most productive firms. The empirical correlation between these two variables
is negative. The model explains this fact by positive sorting. The following section details the
relationship.
4.2.1 Sorting, unemployment durations and reemployment wages
Consider the initial wages of workers that are hired out of unemployment into top rank firms. In
the empirically relevant case of κ ≤ 1, these matches are characterized by firms of type p = 1 and
bargaining position q = 0, and the reemployment wage is a direct reflection of the model object,
w(h, 0, 1) = βf(h, 1) + (1− β)rV ∗0 (h), (19)
where rV ∗0 (h) = maxs≥0
{
f(h, 0)− c(s)+ (µ+κs)λβ ∫ 1
0
[V (h, p′)− V 0(h)] dΓ(p′)
}
is the value
of unemployment of a skill h worker net of the exogenous reallocation shocks. By equation (19),
these particular reemployment wages are monotonically increasing in h, and therefore provide a
ranking of workers by skill level. With a supermodular production technology, s′0(h) > 0; that
is, unemployed search intensity is increasing in h. That is, more skilled workers have on aver-
age shorter unemployment durations. Taken together, supermodular production functions induce
a negative correlation between unemployment duration and subsequent initial wages among work-
20The empirical poaching ranks contains estimation (sampling) error. Hence, some firms will be misclassified as
belonging to a particular decile in the firm productivity distribution. As workers know their employer’s true rank,
misclassification induces search intensity heterogeneity within a measured firm rank.
21Recent notable efforts in firm classification such as Bonhomme, Lamadon, and Manresa (2015) and Lentz,
Piyapromdee, and Robin (2016) identify firm classifications in discrete mixture frameworks. It remains an unsolved
problem for these analyses that they do not intrinsically understand the uncertainty in the firm classification.
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ers hired into top rank firms.22 Moreover, the stronger the complementarities in the production
function, the stronger the correlation between reemployment wages for workers hired out of unem-
ployment by the most productive firms and these workers’ unemployment durations. If sorting is
negative the correlation has the opposite sign, allowing a distinction between positive and negative
sorting.
In terms of empirical implementation, for each worker ever observed in unemployment we com-
pute the individual average unemployment duration, which we denote τ 0i . We use the poaching
rank to identify the top rungs of the firm ladder. Specifically, we use the top 5% of firms in the
rank distribution. We then select all combinations of individuals and points in time (collected
in the set F̂ 0) where the individual has just been hired out of unemployment into one of these
firms.23 We find that, the auxiliary statistic of interest is corr(τ 0i , wit | (i, t) ∈ F̂ 0). In addition,
we include the means and standard deviations of τ 0i and wit for (i, t) ∈ F̂ 0. Empirically, we find
corr(τ 0i , wit | (i, t) ∈ F̂ 0) = −0.186 . In isolation, this statistic points to positive sorting.
If we condition on education, we find that workers with less than 12 years of education have
an average unemployment duration of 76 weeks. The average unemployment duration for workers
with exactly 12 years of education is 55 weeks and that of workers with more than 12 years of
education is 49 weeks. Thus, more educated workers have shorter durations. In combination with
the match allocation evidence in Figure 4 we thus see that more educated workers are matched
with higher ranked firms and when they are unemployed they move faster out of unemployment.
Subject to a positive correlation between the unobserved skill h and education length we thus see
evidence of positive assortative matching as well as the mechanism that generates it, where more
skilled workers leave low rank matches faster.
4.3 Worker reallocation
We next present a number of data moments that relate more broadly to worker reallocation that we
want our model to reproduce.
22If κ > 1, unemployed search is more efficient than employed search. With a supermodular production function,
high skill workers may now reject offers from the bottom of the firm ladder and unemployment durations may be
increasing in the worker skill type. As noted above, empirically we find κ ≤ 1.
23We measure the starting wage as the wage on record at the first post-transition November cross section date. For
the estimation, we reproduce this observation scheme in the simulations.
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4.3.1 Hazard rates
To economize on the number of statistics that we fit the model to, we capture the EE hazard char-
acteristics in Figure 3 through the inclusion of the 1st and 7th quarter EE hazards, which helps to
identify the search intensity across worker and firm types. We also include the 1st quarter rank
conditional EU hazard which identifies the δ(p) relationship. As noted the EU hazard is strongly
decreasing in firm rank and a decreasing layoff rate in firm type will allow the model to explain this
relationship.
The job finding rate is identified by E[τ 0i ] and sd[τ
0
i ]. To further discipline the overall relation-
ship between the layoff rates and unemployed search, we include the overall unemployment rate in
the data, which is measured at 0.22. We are employing a somewhat broad definition of unemploy-
ment which accounts for the relatively high unemployment rate.
4.3.2 Rank conditional destination distribution
We include the origin conditional average destination rank, shown in the upper, right hand panel of
Figure 3. The stochastically increasing relationship between the rank of the worker’s current firm
and the rank of the destination firm in case of a job-to-job transition is consistent with standard
on-the-job search models such as Burdett and Mortensen (1998), but taking that model literally, the
destination distribution is simply the offer distribution censored to the left at the current firm rank.
This of course is not consistent with the data pattern presented in the upper, left panel of Figure 3
where there is non-neglibible probability mass below the diagonal. Our model interprets downward
movement on the productivity ladder as a result of advance notice shocks and bymeasurement noise
in the firm classification. The sensitivity of the worker’s response to the advance notice as reflected
in n(p) is identified by this part of the data.
4.3.3 Employment cycles and unemployment
To quantify the job-to-job reallocation speed relative to the layoff rate into unemployment, we sam-
ple employment spells and determine the number of jobs per employment cycle. An employment
cycle is a sequence of consecutive job spells with no intervening unemployment spells. Specifi-
cally, we extract a sequence of annually stock sampled employment spells. For each cross section
of spells, we record the number of jobs in the employment cycle that the job belongs to, counting
both left- and right-censored jobs. We include the average number of jobs per employment cycle,
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and the standard error of the number of jobs per employment cycle in the set of auxiliary statistics
that we want to fit. In the data, there are on average 2.182 jobs per employment cycle with a standard
deviation of 1.541.
4.3.4 Record statistics
To provide additional information on the advance notice arrival rate δ0 we consider the probability
that a randomly stock sampled job spell ends in a layoff. In an on-the-job searchmodel with constant
offer arrival rate and without exogenous job-to-job reallocation, Barlevy and Nagaraja (2013) show
that the statistic is bounded below by 1/2.24 Using the annually stock sampled employment spells
described above, we include in the vector of auxiliary statistics the average share of non-right-
censored cross section matches that ends in a job-to-unemployment transition. Empirically, this
share is 0.338, inconsistent with a pure on-the-job search model where all job-to-job transitions are
from lower to higher ranked firms.
4.4 Wages
We exploit the matched employer-employee wage data to help pin down the worker and firm het-
erogeneity distributions. The analysis data provide annual measurements on workers’ wages for the
ongoing jobs in the last week of November which we use to extract an annual matched employer-
employee wage panel. The unit of observation is a given (employed) worker in a given year. In this
subsection we let i index workers, t index annual cross sections, let j(i, t) be a function that assigns
the ID of the employing firm. That is, j(i, t) = j if worker i is employed by firm j in cross section
t.
4.4.1 Log wage regression
We include a restricted version of the Abowd et al. (1999) log wage regression in our set of aux-
iliary models.25 Specifically, consider the following matched employer-employee panel log wage
24Hence, we take information about δ0 both from this record type statistics as well as from the EE hazard at top rank
firms as described above. The use of the latter statistic to identify δ0 is possibly sensitive to the assumption that all
workers agree on the ranking of firms. This is for example not the case in the partnership sorting model in Shimer and
Smith (2000) if there are complementarities in the production function. However, the use of the Barlevy and Nagaraja
(2013) statistic to inform δ0 is robust to this issue since it is primarily a reflection of the relative rates by which workers
move up their respective ladders.
25The full Abowd et al. (1999) log wage regression is not well suited as an auxiliary model due to its computational
complexity. However, previewing some of our post-estimation analysis, our model is able to reproduce the Abowd et al.
(1999) wage decomposition well.
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regression
lnwit = ϕj(i,t) + χi + ǫit (20)
where ϕj(i,t) is a firm effect, χi is a worker effect, and ǫit is a residual. When estimating (20) we
imposeE
[
ϕj(i,t)ǫit
]
= E [χiǫit] = 0 and E
[
χiϕj(i,t)
]
= 0 for all i and t. The first two assumptions
impose “exogenous mobility” in the terminology of Abowd et al. (1999), allowing for estimation
of the parameters in (20), including the fixed effects, by OLS. The third restriction, not imposed
in Abowd et al. (1999), implies uncorrelated firm and worker effects, as estimated from (20). This
latter restriction eases the computational burden involved in estimating (20) considerably, allowing
us to include statistics based on (20) in the vector of auxiliary statistics. We estimate (20) by OLS
and include the average firm effect E[ϕ] and its standard deviation sd(ϕ), as well as the standard
deviations of the estimated worker effects and the residuals, sd(χ) and sd(ǫ). The average worker
effect and the average residual are normalized to zero, so ϕ represents the average log wage in the
cross section. We find E[ϕ] = 5.238, sd(ϕ) = 0.179, sd(χ) = 0.218, and sd(ǫ) = 0.134.
4.4.2 Starting wages and wage growth
To capture the firm ladder effect on wages, we include the first and second moments of the empirical
distribution of starting wages in jobs initiated from unemployment. Denote by F 0 the set of (i, t)
combinations where worker i has just been hired out of unemployment. Empirically, we find the
average log starting wage is E[wit | (i, t) ∈ F 0] = 5.09 with standard deviation sd[wit | (i, t) ∈
F 0] = 0.29.26 Note that these observations are consistent with a firm ladder model where on-the-
job search implies the average cross section wage (E[ϕ] = 5.238) exceeds the average starting wage.
Furthermore, the average log starting wage for individuals hired directly from unemployment into
top firms is, E[wit | (i, t) ∈ F 0] = 5.19. This is dominated by the average log wage in the cross
section, which the model understands through the lower initial bargaining position of workers hired
directly out of unemployment.
The model links search behavior and within-job wage growth. The quantitative effect of on-
the-job search on within-job wage growth depends on workers bargaining power parameter. We
add average annual within-job wage growth, which the data reveals to be be 0.011, to the vector of
auxiliary statistics.
26As noted above we observe the average annual wage of a job. The starting wage is taken to be the average wage
during the first calendar year of the job. We of course reproduce this computation in the simulation based estimation
procedure.
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4.4.3 Mean-min ratio
Hornstein et al. (2011) propose the mean-min ratio as a useful and parsimonious measure of wage
dispersion, and argue that a basic wage search model without worker heterogeneity cannot generate
enough wage dispersion as reflected in the mean-min ratio. However, the wage process we employ
may in fact produce too much dispersion as measured by the mean-min ratio because initial wages
can be low. The extent to which this occurs is driven by workers’ bargaining power parameter β,
and the mean-min ratio thus serves to discipline β in the estimation.27 The data used for computing
the mean-min ratio is the same as that used for estimation of the auxiliary log wage regression.
We estimate the minimum wage as the average wage among the lower 5 percentiles in the wage
distribution.28 Denote the estimate minimum wage by w, and the mean wage by w. Then we
includeMm = w/w in the vector of auxiliary statistics. The empirical mean-min ratio is 1.85.
5 Model estimation and fit
5.1 Parameterization and estimation
We adopt a search cost function specification where c (s) = c′ (s) = 0 for some s ≥ 0.29 The
worker’s choice of offer arrival rate is in the range s ∈ [s,∞[. This is done to allow the possibility
that worker search intensity is not an essential good in the creation of matches. The firm’s recruit-
ment cost function is cν(ν) for recruitment intensity ν ∈ [0,∞[. The cost functions are given by
increasing and convex functions,
c(s) =
(
c0(s− s)
)1+1/c1
1 + 1/c1
and cν(ν) =
ν1+1/cν1
1 + 1/cν1
. (21)
where c0 > 0 and the recruitment cost function constant has been normalized at unity. c1 > 0 and
cν1 > 0 determine curvatures.
The match production function is specified as a CES function,
f(h, p) = f0
(
αhρ + (1− α)pρ)1/ρ, (22)
27In the extreme, if β = 1 the worker simply gets w (h, p) = f (h, p). For lower bargaining power, the initial wage
in an employment relationship will be reduced by the expectation of future wage gains.
28We use a “raw” version of this statistic rather than on the residual of some Mincerian wage equation controlling
for observable heterogeneity.
29If s is large, it impacts the monotonicity argument of w(h, 0, 1), which in turn modifies the interpretation of the
correlation between wages and unemployment duration. For the relevant ranges of s this is a secondary issue, and does
in any case not affect the validity of the estimation.
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where f0 is a scale parameter, and α ∈ [0, 1] sets the weight that is put on the skill index relative to
the firm productivity index. The modularity of the CES function is governed by ρ. If ρ < 1, then
the production function is supermodular. It is submodular for ρ > 1, and it is modular for ρ = 1.
The firm type conditional layoff rate is parameterized by δ(p) = δH − (δH − δL)pς , where
δH ≥ δL are the layoff rates for the lowest and highest firm types, respectively. ς > 0 governs the
interpolation for the firm types in between. With a similar specification, the number of offer draws
in case of a layoff shock is specified by, n(p) = 1+ n0pς0 , where n0 +1 ≥ 1 is the number of offer
draws that workers make in top firms in case of an advance notice shock. By construction, workers
make a single draw from the offer distribution when in the lowest firm types. Finally, ς0 governs
the interpolation for the firm types in between.
We parameterize the firm productivity distribution,Φ (p), as a Beta distributionwith parameters(
βΦ0 , β
Φ
1
)
and the worker skill distribution is assumed to be a Beta distribution with parameters(
βΨ0 , β
Ψ
1
)
.30 We allow for classical measurement errors εw in annual individual wage observations,
with εw ∽ N (0, σ2w).
The annual discount rate is fixed at r = 0.05 and equilibrium market tightness is normalized at
λ(θ) = 1. The labor force size is normalized at 1. We setm = 0.091matching the number of firms
relative to worker population in the data. By targeting the unemployment rate we match the average
firm size in the data. Furthermore, c0 and cv0 are not separately identified so we normalize cν0 = 1.
This leaves us with 20 free structural parameters. Let ω be the structural parameter vector, which
we estimate by Indirect Inference (Gourieroux et al., 1993).
The Indirect Inference estimator is
ω̂ = argmin
ω
[a(ω0)− aS(ω)]′Σ[a(ω0)− aS(ω)],
where a(ω0) is a vector of specific auxiliary statistics and data moments computed on real data, a
function the true parameter value ω0, aS(ω) =
1
S
∑S
s=1 as(ω) is the same vector, but computed on
S simulated datasets from the structuralmodel at some parameter valueω, andΣ is a symmetric and
positive definite weighting matrix. In Appendix F, we present estimation results for the efficiently
chosen weightingmatrix where the variance-covariance matrix of the auxiliary statistics is obtained
by bootstrap. Given the size of the data, all the statistics are precisely estimated, but the wage
statistics are more so. Therefore, they receive relatively high weight. As it turns out, this results
30This means that we are solving for the equilibrium fixed point vacancy offer distribution Γ (p) in each simulation
iteration.
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in a fit to the core reallocation statistics that leaves something to be desired. Given the focus of
reallocation in the identification strategy of the paper we will in the main part of the paper present
results that achieve a more balanced fit to the auxiliary statistics. We choose a diagonal weighting
matrix that puts somewhat less weight on the wage statistics than the efficient weighting matrix
does. Together, the two estimates provide a good illustration of identifying power of the reallocation
statistics as it pertains to sorting. We report the weighting matrix we employ in Appendix E.
For suitable choices ofa, and under regularity conditions, seeGourieroux et al. (1993),
√
N(ω̂−
ω0) →d N (0, (1 + S−1)[J′ΣJ]−1J′ΣŴΣJ[J′ΣJ]−1) where N is the number of observations in
the data and J = ∂a(ω)/∂ω, evaluated at ω̂.
5.2 Model estimate
The estimated structural parameters are presented in Table 2. The production function is with an
estimate of ρ = −7.30 estimated to be supermodular. In section 6 we quantify the strength of
the complementarity in terms of the output gains in a perfectly sorted economy. Worker and firm
heterogeneity distribution are both estimated to have strictly decreasing densities. In section 7 we
provide a wage variance decomposition that quantifies the impact of the estimated heterogeneity on
wages.
There is substantial heterogeneity in the layoff rates across firm types. At the very top, the annual
layoff rate is only 0.014 whereas in the least productive firm layoffs happen on average every 1.5
years. Forced reallocation through advance notices are estimated to happen relatively infrequently
at an annual rate of δ0 = 0.078, which means on average every 12.8 years. There is at the very
top firms a substantially different response to the advance notice shock than at the bottom. At the
top, the destination firm is a result of 5.43 draws. Thus, the data firmly reject the simple version
of the exogenous reallocation shock where a worker is presented with a single draw from the offer
distribution or face unemployment (the Godfather shock). There is substantial curvature in the
n(p) function, though, meaning that the deviation from the Godfather shock happens primarily at
the very top of the firm distribution (for example, n(0.9) = 1.7). The pure Godfather shock implies
a bell shaped average destination rank conditional on the rank of the current firm. At the very top,
workers move to other firms only in the case of exogenous reallocation, which in the case of the
Godfather shock would just be a single draw from the offer distribution. At the bottom of the firm
hierarchy, workers accept any outside offer. Hence, the destination distributions out of firms at the
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Table 2: Structural parameter estimates
Structural parameter Estimate Structural parameter Estimate
Top layoff rate δ(1) 0.014
(0.001)
Φ(p) = Beta(βΦ0 , β
Φ
1 )
Bottom layoff rate, δ(0) 0.682
(0.003)
βΦ0 0.196
(0.001)
δ(p) curvature, ς 1.387
(0.003)
βΦ1 7.725
(0.011)
Search cost function
(c0(s−s))1+1/c1
1+1/c1
Ψ(h) = Beta(βΨ0 , β
Ψ
1 )
Free search, s 0.010
(0.001)
βΨ0 0.211
(0.002)
c0 2.606
(0.003)
βΨ1 3.000
(0.005)
c1 1.475
(0.002)
f(h, p) =
f0
(
αhρ + (1− α)pρ
)1/ρ
Recruitment cost function
cν(ν) =
ν1+1/cν1
1+1/cν1
ρ −7.303
(0.008)
cν1 0.006
(0.001)
α 0.644
(0.002)
Unemployed search efficiency, κ 0.851
(0.002)
f0 1494.378
(0.023)
Advance notice shock, δ0 0.078
(0.001)
Workers’ bargaining power, β 0.231
(0.001)
Draws at top firm, n(1) 5.430
(0.003)
Std. dev., wage measurement
error, σw
0.052
(0.004)
n(p) curvature, ς0 19.580
(0.010)
Note: All rates at annual frequency. Standard errors in parentheses.
very top and at the very bottom become identical, which is strongly rejected by the data.
The firm heterogeneity in the layoff and advance notice shocks combine to produce an environ-
ment in which there is stronger persistence in the worker’s position on the ladder. Workers located
on the lower tiers are more likely to be laid off and must climb back up. Workers further up are less
likely to be laid off, and when hit with exogenous reallocation shocks, they move subject to stochas-
tically better destination distributions. These mechanics work to amplify the sorting implications
from variation in search intensity across workers.
The search cost function is estimated to have somewhat less curvature than a quadratic and
there is very little free search. Furthermore, unemployed search is estimated to be less efficient
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Figure 5: Search intensity by skill and firm rank.
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than employed search, although only by about 15%, κ = 0.85. Based on survey data on search
methods and intensity, Faberman et al. (2016) also find unemployed search to be less efficient than
employed search, although significantly more so than we do.
The bargaining parameter is estimated at β = 0.23. The estimate is broadly consistent with
other estimates reported in Cahuc et al. (2006), Bagger et al. (2014) and Bagger et al. (2014). As
expected, wages are measured with error although with an estimate σw = 0.05measurement errors
are of modest importance.
Finally, Figure 5 shows the implied search intensities by worker skill conditional on observing
the worker in a given rank firm, as measured by the poaching rank πˆ. These skill conditional search
intensities aggregate to fit the empirical job-to-job mobility patterns in Figure 3. As dictated by the
model, search intensity is decreasing in firm type. Given the supermodular production function,
more skilled workers search more than less skilled workers in a given firm rank. Low skill workers
are estimated to search relatively little whereas high skilled workers search in low rank firms so as
to have spell durations roughly comparable to that of American unemployed workers. It is quite
rare in steady state to observe a high skill worker with a low rank firm.
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5.3 Model fit
The estimated model’s fit to the auxiliary statistics is reported in Table 3. In Appendix F, we show
the model fit for the efficiently weighted estimate. As mentioned earlier, the efficiently weighted
estimate puts strong emphasis on particular wage related moments at the expense of large parts of
the mobility moments. The estimate we are presenting in the main text achieves a more balanced
fit. We report the weighting matrix in Appendix E.
5.3.1 Labor market sorting
We have included two sets of statistics that speak directly to the issue of labor market sorting.
Moments 28-47 in Table 3 describe the 1st and 7th quarter job-to-job hazards and moment 14 is
the correlation between unemployment duration and reemployment wages for workers hired into
the top ranked firms.
The model estimate captures nicely the decreasing relationship between current firm rank and
the workers propensity to move to other firms. This is a feature emphasized in Christensen et al.
(2005). Furthermore, themodel does well in fitting that this relationship is stronger in the 1st quarter
than in the 7th quarter. In particular, the propensity to leave low rank firms is much stronger in the
1st quarter than it is in the 7th quarter whereas there is little duration dependence in the hazard
for the top rank firms. The model explains this through greater heterogeneity in search intensities
across workers in low rank firms than in high rank firms, which is associated with sorting.
The model also fits the correlation between unemployment duration and subsequent wages quite
well, slightly overshooting it. The model estimate implies a correlation between worker skill and
firm productivity in steady state of 0.37. In the efficiently weighted estimate presented in the ap-
pendix, the relatively lower weight placed on mobility statistics result in a lower steady state (h, p)
correlation of 0.2 which is reflected in a weaker correlation between unemployment duration and
reemployment wages (of only −0.07) and the estimate also fails to capture the difference between
the 1st and 7th quarter EE hazards in the data. This is a useful illustration of how these moments
reveal sorting through worker reallocation.
5.3.2 Worker reallocation
Moments 18-27 in Table 3 are the average destination firm rank conditional on a job-to-jobmove and
the rank of the origin firm. The data show that workers in higher ranked firms tend tomove to higher
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Table 3: Model fit
Moment Data Model Moment Data Model Moment Data Model
1 E[ϕ] 5.238
(0.0004)
5.268 18 E[ιd | ιo = 1] 4.714
(0.0163)
6.033 38 ϑEE7 (1) 0.043
(0.0013)
0.070
2 sd[ϕ] 0.179
(0.0003)
0.170 19 E[ιd | ιo = 2] 5.378
(0.0163)
6.426 39 ϑEE7 (2) 0.043
(0.0011)
0.058
3 sd[χ] 0.218
(0.0003)
0.218 20 E[ιd | ιo = 3] 5.887
(0.0142)
6.664 40 ϑEE7 (3) 0.049
(0.0010)
0.054
4 sd[ǫ] 0.134
(0.0001)
0.165 21 E[ιd | ιo = 4] 5.937
(0.0155)
6.767 41 ϑEE7 (4) 0.045
(0.0011)
0.050
5 E[wit | (i, t) ∈ F 0] 5.095
(0.0006)
5.047 22 E[ιd | ιo = 5] 5.989
(0.0148)
6.913 42 ϑEE7 (5) 0.047
(0.0012)
0.044
6 sd[wit | (i, t) ∈ F 0] 0.287
(0.0005)
0.202 23 E[ιd | ιo = 6] 6.360
(0.0137)
6.970 43 ϑEE7 (6) 0.050
(0.0011)
0.041
7 E[wit | (i, t) ∈ F̂ 0] 5.192
(0.0095)
5.130 24 E[ιd | ιo = 7] 6.496
(0.0156)
6.992 44 ϑEE7 (7) 0.048
(0.0011)
0.038
8 sd[wit | (i, t) ∈ F̂ 0] 0.308
(0.0083)
0.222 25 E[ιd | ιo = 8] 6.568
(0.0153)
7.018 45 ϑEE7 (8) 0.037
(0.0009)
0.035
9 E[∆wit | j(i, t) = j(i, t− 1)] 0.011
(0.0001)
0.008 26 E[ιd | ιo = 9] 6.770
(0.0148)
7.000 46 ϑEE7 (9) 0.037
(0.0009)
0.032
10 w/w 1.854
(0.0011)
1.615 27 E[ιd | ιo = 10] 7.915
(0.0148)
7.004 47 ϑEE7 (10) 0.033
(0.0009)
0.030
11 E[dEUiτ = 1 | τ ≥ 0] 0.338
(0.0008)
0.437 28 ϑEE1 (1) 0.155
(0.0013)
0.193 48 ϑEU1 (1) 0.107
(0.0011)
0.088
12 E[τ 0i | (i, t) ∈ F̂ 0] 1.054
(0.0405)
1.146 29 ϑEE1 (2) 0.145
(0.0012)
0.152 49 ϑEU1 (2) 0.079
(0.0010)
0.068
13 sd[τ 0i | (i, t) ∈ F̂ 0] 1.263
(0.0829)
1.250 30 ϑEE1 (3) 0.132
(0.0010)
0.129 50 ϑEU1 (3) 0.063
(0.0008)
0.059
14 corr(τ 0i , wit | (i, t) ∈ F̂ 0) −0.186
(0.0316)
−0.228 31 ϑEE1 (4) 0.120
(0.0011)
0.113 51 ϑEU1 (4) 0.053
(0.0008)
0.052
15 Avg. jobs per emp. spell 2.192
(0.0022)
2.297 32 ϑEE1 (5) 0.123
(0.0012)
0.090 52 ϑEU1 (5) 0.050
(0.0008)
0.042
16 Std. dev. job per emp. spell 1.551
(0.0036)
1.571 33 ϑEE1 (6) 0.114
(0.0011)
0.077 53 ϑEU1 (6) 0.041
(0.0007)
0.036
17 Unemployment rate 0.218
(0.0004)
0.183 34 ϑEE1 (7) 0.108
(0.0012)
0.065 54 ϑEU1 (7) 0.037
(0.0007)
0.031
35 ϑEE1 (8) 0.093
(0.0010)
0.054 55 ϑEU1 (8) 0.032
(0.0006)
0.025
36 ϑEE1 (9) 0.077
(0.0009)
0.047 56 ϑEU1 (9) 0.024
(0.0005)
0.022
37 ϑEE1 (10) 0.052
(0.0007)
0.041 57 ϑEU1 (10) 0.014
(0.0004)
0.019
Note: Standard errors in parentheses (computed by bootstrap). Hazard rates (moments 28-57) are quarterly.
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ranked firms conditional on a job-to-job move. The model estimate shows the same pattern but is
somewhat flatter than that in the data, overestimating the destination rank distribution for lower rank
firms. Hence, the model estimate will tend to underestimate the persistence of a worker’s position
on the lower part of the firm ladder. The model does however capture well the relationship between
firm rank and layoff rate as reflected in moments 48-57 in Table 3, which show the 1st quarter layoff
hazards conditional on firm rank. One can through this moment also glean the implied noise in the
relationship between a firm’s estimated firm rank and its true type. The lowest firm type is estimated
to have an annual layoff rate of δ(0) = 0.6 whereas the lowest 10% of firms is estimated to lay off
workers at annual rate of roughly 0.35, reflecting some higher type firms have been misclassified.
The simulation based estimation method understands this source of noise and the estimate of δ(p)
reflects it.
The estimation matches well the number of jobs in employment cycles (both average and vari-
ance, moments 15 and 16 in Table 3). The model overestimates somewhat the probability that a
randomly selected spell ends in unemployment, moment 11. This is partly related to the overesti-
mate of the destination distribution of firm types at the low end firms. With a greater propensity
to stay in low type firms, these workers would remain subject to the higher layoff rates.31 Finally,
the estimate matches well the unemployment duration distribution of workers entering top firms
(moments 12 and 13) as well as the overall unemployment rate in the economy, moment 17. As
mentioned earlier, we adopted a somewhat broad definition of unemployment which accounts for
both the relatively long average durations as well as the high unemployment rate.
5.3.3 Wage moments
The model fits the log wage decomposition in moments 1-4 in Table 3 very well, slightly over-
estimating the average wage and the residual wage variance. The model also fits the pattern that
the steady state average wage dominates both the initial wage out of unemployment for all work-
ers, moment 5, and the initial wage out of unemployment in top firms, moment 7. Furthermore,
the estimation also fits that top firms on average pay more for workers hired directly out of unem-
ployment. It is not trivial to obtain this result in a setting such as Postel-Vinay and Robin (2002)
because the greater wage growth rate in top firms makes the initial wage in top firms lower than
that of other firms. The lower search intensity in top firms is a helpful feature in our model in this
31We conjecture that some degree of direction of search could be a helpful feature in this context, but this is beyond
the scope of this paper.
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respect. Otherwise, this moment would put a strong discipline on the bargaining parameter, β. The
model underestimates the mean-min ratio somewhat but given the nice fit to the overall log wage
variance decomposition, we consider it a minor blemish.
Within job wage growth (moment 9 in Table 3) is significant determinant of the bargaining
power parameter in the model. The lower the bargaining power, the greater the within job wage
growth because accumulated bargaining position becomes a more significant determinant of rent
extraction by the worker. Of course, in the extreme where β = 0 there is no incentive to search and
worker reallocation shuts down. The model estimate implies within annual wage growth of 0.8%
which is a little below that in the data leaving some room for other accumulation mechanisms that
would imply wage growth.
6 Output and mismatch
In a labor market with two-sided heterogeneity, the specific allocation of workers to firms impacts
aggregate output. With a supermodular production technology, high skilled workers are more mis-
matched in low productive firms than low skilled workers. The high skilled workers react by search-
ing intensely for better jobs and therefore leave low productive firms faster than their low skilled
colleagues. This endogenous search intensity response alleviates, but does not eliminate, mismatch
in the labor market. In this section we quantify the cost of labor market mismatch in terms of
foregone output due to mismatch.
Our analysis has two parts. In the first, we assess the output gains from workers’ search inten-
sity response to individual mismatch. This analysis involves a comparison between our estimated
decentralized economy and two counterfactual planner economies: (a) A planner economy where
the planner is unable to induce sorting, and (b) A planner economy where the planner can induce
sorting. To remain aligned with the mismatch literature, see e.g. Shimer and Smith (2000) and
Gautier and Teulings (2012), where job and worker populations are given exogenously, both plan-
ners are constrained to set hiring intensities so as to match the estimated vacancy distribution Γ(·),
and are also subject to the estimated frictions in the economy. In other words, the planner can set
search and hiring intensities, but cannot freely allocate workers across (a fixed set of) vacancies.
In the second part, we allow the planner to circumvent labor market frictions and implement a per-
fectly sorted economy: Given the estimated population of jobs in the economy, the planner directly
allocates workers across these jobs in such a way that aggregate output is maximized.
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6.1 Search intensity and mismatch
Subject to the vacancy distribution restriction and labor market frictions, a planner may improve
on the decentralized economy in two dimensions. First, the total amount of search and recruitment
in the decentralized economy may be inefficient. Second, the distribution of search intensities
across worker skill levels may be inefficient. The inefficiencies in the decentralized economy arise
due to congestion and thick market externalities in the search and recruitment process, see e.g.
Hosios (1990). The “sorting planner” can address inefficiency in both these dimensions. The “no
sorting planner” can only distinguish between the search intensity of an unemployed worker and
an employed worker, but cannot vary search intensity across workers with different skill levels. An
output (net of search cost) comparison between the decentralized economy and the sorting planner
economy quantifies the total inefficiency in the decentralized economy. A comparison between
the sorting and no sorting planner economies quantifies the efficiency gain from sorting through
search intensity heterogeneity. Finally, a comparison between the decentralized economy and the
no sorting planner economy yields the efficiency gains from pegging the general level of search at
the efficient level.
The sorting planner maximizes total output in the economy less vacancy and search costs,
W = max
s(h,p),s0(h),ν(p)
∫ 1
0
{
eh
∫ 1
0
[
f(h, p)− c(s(h, p))]g(p|h)dp
+ (1− eh)
[
f(h, 0)− c(s0(h))]}dΨ(h)−m ∫ 1
0
cν
(
ν(p)
)
dΦ(p),
where g(p|h) is defined in equation (9).32 The maximization is done subject to the steady state
equilibrium conditions for
(
g(p|h), eh,Γ(·), θ
)
in equations (9), (10), (14), and (15), as well as the
constraint that the estimated vacancy distribution Γ(·) is maintained in the planner economies. The
no sorting planner can distinguish between unemployed and employed search intensity, (s0, s, ν),
only. In addition, we specify the matching function to be Cobb-Douglas,
λ(θ) = Aθζ .
Our analysis has not identified the matching function elasticity, ζ . It plays an important role for the
planner’s ability to substitute vacancy intensity with worker search intensity and vice versa in the
creation of matches. Maintaining the estimated vacancy distribution Γ(·) in the planner solutions
32The expression uses that employed search is at least as efficient as unemployed search, κ < 1, such thatR(h) = 0.
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Table 4: Decentralized and planner economies
W corr(h, p) Y
Decentralized economy 0.985 0.37 1.000
No sorting planner 0.922 0.00 0.960
Sorting planner 0.999 0.36 1.042
Estimated job and worker populations, perfectly sorted 1.00 1.081
reduces the importance of the parameterization of ζ . Following Petrongolo and Pissarides (2001)
we set ζ = 0.5.
The top panel of Table 4 shows the criterion value W , the induced sorting as measured by
the correlation between worker skill and firm productivity, corr(h, p), and output, Y , for the three
economies described abovewith the decentralized economy output normalized at unity. The sorting
planner improves on the decentralized economy by an increase of output net of search cost of 1.4%.
This comes about through a generally higher level of search intensity that reduces unemployment
and moves workers higher up the firm ladder while reducing the level of sorting slightly from a
correlation coefficient of 0.37 to 0.36. As a result, output increases by 4.2% but the increased search
costs offset much of the gain.33 The no sorting planner solution reported in Table 4 demonstrates
the importance of sorting. In this case, where there is no sorting both output as well as output
net of search cost drop significantly relative to the decentralized economy. This demonstrates that
individual search intensity responses to labor market mismatch provide significant efficiency gains.
6.2 The perfectly sorted economy
The analyses of labor market mismatch in for example Gautier and Teulings (2012), Hagedorn et al.
(2016) and in Shimer and Smith (2000) take the populations of jobs and workers as given and ask
to what extent the equilibrium in question can be improved upon by changing the allocation of
workers to firms. We determine a similar notion of mismatch in our setting: Take the estimated
population of jobs in the economy as represented by the employment levels eh and the distributions
g(p|h). Then, assign the estimated population of workers, unemployed and employed, to jobs and
unemployment in order maximize aggregate output. We do not concern ourselves with how exactly
a social planner might obtain this assignment. The assignment represents a first best non-frictional
33The planner solutions are available upon request.
38
assignment in the spirit of a core assignment in Becker (1973), for a given population of jobs.34
Since the production function is estimated to be (globally) supermodular, the optimal allocation
result in Becker (1973) dictates that the highest skill worker be matched with the most productive
job, the second highest skill worker with the second highest productivity job, and so forth.
As shown in the bottom panel of Table 4, we find the perfect allocation of workers to jobs pro-
duces an output gain of 8.1%. The result is remarkably close to the measure of mismatch in Gautier
and Teulings (2012). While the correlation between h and p in the estimated economy is only 0.37
and therefore suggests substantial misallocation, the magnitude of the efficiency improvement from
the perfect allocation depends on the magnitude of the complementarity in the production function
over the support of the firm and worker population types. A modular production function would
imply a zero efficiency gain from the perfect allocation.
7 Sorting and wage dispersion
We use our structural model to decompose the variance of log wages into worker heterogeneity, firm
heterogeneity, imperfect labor market competition, and sorting. We further show that the estimated
model is largely consistent with the standard matched employer-employee wage regression pio-
neered by Abowd et al. (1999), and discuss how our decomposition relate to the log wage variance
decompositions presented in Abowd et al. (1999) and Postel-Vinay and Robin (2002) who reach
somewhat contrasting conclusions regarding the importance of worker heterogeneity in shaping
individual wage outcomes.
7.1 Labor market competition and sorting
The equilibrium wage distribution is a transformation of the equilibrium distribution of worker
skill h, firm productivity p, and bargaining position q, formally the productivity of the last firm
from which a worker has been able to extract full match value. The distribution of (h, p, q) is given
by (11) and (12), and (h, p, q) are mapped into wages w according to (1). Appendix D provides
details on the model’s wage equation.
The distribution of (h, p, q) is not observed in our data, but is obtained from the estimated
structural model. Indeed, it is straightforward to simulate a matched employer-employee dataset
34This counterfactual should not be confused with an exercise of eliminating frictions in our model and letting job
creation respond in equilibrium.
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with individual labor market histories from the model. We simulate the careers of 500,000 workers
over 10 years, recording h, p, and q. From this, we compute simulated wages w = w(h, p, q).35
The object of interest is Var(lnw).36
The implied wage equation is complicated and highly nonlinear in the components h, p, and
q, and does not admit an analytical, closed form log wage variance decomposition. To proceed,
we base our log wage variance decomposition on predicted log wages from a regression of the
simulated log wages lnw onto indicator variables for the finite number of discrete values for h, p
and q. In the estimation, we approximate worker and firm heterogeneity distributions Ψ(h) and
Φ(p) with discrete distributions of 25 distinct h-values and 60 distinct values of p (and hence,
61 distinct values of q). Let Dh, Dp and Dq be design matrices of indicator variables for each
worker type h, firm type p, and bargaining threshold q in the simulated worker panel. Dh has
generic row d′h, with Dp and Dq constructed analogously. Projecting lnw onto the column space
of D = [1 Dh Dp Dq ]—with normalizations to ensure D has full column rank—yields the
(minimum mean square) predicted wages,
lnw∗ = ξ0 + h
∗ + p∗ + q∗. (23)
where h∗ = d′hξh, p
∗ = d′pξp, q
∗ = d′qξq, and ξ =
[
ξ0 ξ
′
h ξ
′
p ξ
′
q
]′
= (D′D)−1D′ lnw.
Unlike the simulated log wages lnw, the predicted simulatedwages lnw∗ are linear in a worker skill
component h∗, a firm productivity component p∗ and a bargaining threshold component q∗. Note,
however, that the elements in (h∗, p∗, q∗) are not independent. First, p∗ and q∗ are mechanically
related because p ≥ q, and because both are increasing in a worker’s search capital. Second, labor
market sorting implies dependence between h∗ and p∗ and q∗. The predicted wages, lnw∗, explain
80% of the structural log wage variance, Var(lnw).
Separating between and within match log wage variance in (23) admits a log wage variance
35Observedwages are within-jobwithin-year averagewages. In the estimationwe appropriately averaged themodel’s
point-in-time wages within-job and within-year, and allowed for measurement errors in observed wages. However, for
this analysis of the roles of labor market competition and sorting in shaping the wage distribution, we focus on “pure”
cross section wages w = w(h, p, q).
36Themodel is cast in steady state, so the distribution of wages in the panel is identical to the cross section distribution
of wages. We conduct the analysis on a simulated panel to increase the number of simulated wage observations and
because the panel structure allow us to compare our structural log wage variance decomposition to that obtained from
a log wage regressions with worker and firm fixed effects as in Abowd et al. (1999).
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decomposition in the mold of Postel-Vinay and Robin (2002).37 One obtains,
Var(lnw∗) = Var(E[h∗ + p∗ + q∗ | p∗, h∗])︸ ︷︷ ︸
Between-match
+ E[Var(h∗ + p∗ + q∗ | p∗, h∗)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
Within-match
= Var(h∗)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Worker
+ Var(p∗ + E[q∗ | p∗, h∗])︸ ︷︷ ︸
Firm
+ E[Var(q∗ | p∗, h∗)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
Competition
+ 2Cov(h∗, p∗ + E[q∗ | p∗, h∗])︸ ︷︷ ︸
Sorting
. (24)
The worker heterogeneity component comprises log wage variation arising from worker skills h∗.
The firm heterogeneity component is variation in the ”firm effect” p∗ + E[q∗ | p∗, h∗]. Labeling
p∗ + E[q∗ | p∗, h∗] a firm effect is a slight misnomer as E[q∗ | p∗, h∗] varies across firm- and
worker-types. However, in the absence of sorting, E[q∗ | p∗, h∗] = E[q∗ | p∗] is a proper firm
effect consistent with Postel-Vinay and Robin (2002). The frictional competition reflects within
(h∗, p∗)-match bargaining position variation, i.e. it reflects within-match variance in q∗. Variation
in q∗ is a result of the frictional nature of the labor market. The sorting component arises due to
covariance between the worker effect h∗ and the firm effect p∗+E[q∗ | p∗, h∗]. The worker, firm and
competition effects are present in the log wage variance decomposition of Postel-Vinay and Robin
(2002). The sorting component is new. As the firm effect in (24) has a productivity component, p∗,
and a bargaining position component, E[q∗ | p∗, h∗], the sorting effect may be further decomposed
into sorting on firm productivity, 2Cov(h∗, p∗), and sorting on bargaining position, 2Cov(h∗,E[q∗ |
p∗, h∗]).
The columns labeled “Sorting economy” in Table 5 report the breakdown of log wage varia-
tion according to (24) in values and percentage shares of lnw∗. We focus our comments on the
percentage shares. Consider first the top panel where we report the decomposition into worker,
firm, competition and sorting effects. At 40%, labor market sorting contributes the lion’s share of
the variance in log wages. Worker heterogeneity comprises 30%, firm heterogeneity 20%, and la-
bor market competition—effectively luck—contributes 10% of the log wage variation. The bottom
panel splits the sorting component into sorting on firm productivity, and sorting on bargaining po-
sition. Productivity sorting comprises 23%, and sorting on bargaining position 77% of the overall
sorting component. Hence, our model estimate implies that more productive workers tend to clus-
ter at more productive firms, and within a given firm, more productive workers command a higher
37Postel-Vinay and Robin (2002) derive their wage variance decomposition by separating within- and between-firm
variation, but since their model does not allow sorting, covariances between worker and firm types are zero. In our
model, with sorting, it is natural to separate within- and between-match variation.
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Table 5: Structural log wage variance decomposition: Sorting and no sorting
Sorting economy No sorting economy
Value
% of
Var(lnw∗) Value
% of
Var(lnw∗)
Worker 0.025 30% 0.016 34%
Firm 0.016 20% 0.012 26%
Competition 0.008 10% 0.019 40%
Sorting 0.033 40% 0.000 0%
Total 0.082 100% 0.047 100%
Sorting
Productivity, 2Cov(h∗, p∗) 0.003 23%
Bargaining, 2Cov(h∗,E[q∗ | p∗, h∗]) 0.030 77%
Total 0.033 100%
Note: The “No sorting economy” is obtained by setting n(p) = 1 for all p and calibrating type-independent
unemployed and employed search intensities to match the aggregate unemployment rate (u = 0.170)
and structural log wage variance (V ar(lnw) = 0.101) from the “Sorting economy”.
share of the match output through bargaining with the latter effect being quantitatively the more
important effect for understanding wage dispersion.
To gain further understanding of the role of sorting in shaping the wage distribution, we com-
pare the structural decomposition (24) at the estimated sorting pattern to the same decomposition
obtained in a counterfactual no sorting economy. The no sorting counterfactual also facilitates com-
parison between our results and Postel-Vinay and Robin (2002). Using French data, they find that
worker, firm and competition effects account for 0-35%, 20-50%, and 40-61% of log wage varia-
tion, respectively, with shares varying across occupations. We implement the no sorting economy
by fixing search intensity levels s0 and s1 for unemployed and employed search, respectively, in-
dependent of worker skill and employer productivity, as well as restrict the advanced notice shock
process to be independent of firm-types, i.e. n(p) = 1 for all p. The fixed search intensities s0
and s1 are calibrated such that steady state unemployment and variance of log wages are held con-
stant at their estimated levels.38 We hold all other structural parameters, including the production
technology, fixed at their estimated values.
38The estimated sorting economy implies a steady state unemployment rate of 0.18 and a structural log wage variance
of 0.10. The calibration results in s0 = 0.589 and s1 = 1.540 at annual levels.
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The columns labeled “No sorting economy” in Table 5 presents the counterfactual logwage vari-
ance decomposition.39 Eliminating labor market sorting substantially alters the log wage variance
decomposition. Without sorting, the variance contributions from worker and firm heterogeneity
are stable at 34% and 26% (compared to 30% and 20% in the sorting economy). However, absent
sorting, frictional labor market competition emerges as the primary source of wage variation ac-
counting for 40% of log wage variation, up from only 10% with sorting. Despite differences in
data sources, estimation procedure, and model specification, the shares reported for the no sorting
economy in Table 5 are in line with those reported by Postel-Vinay and Robin (2002) and with the
conclusion that the luck associated with frictional labor market competition is a key source of wage
dispersion.
Table 5 states that the chance of pure frictional wage dispersion plays amuch less prominent role
in the sorting economy compared to the no sorting economy. All variation in bargaining position
in the Postel-Vinay and Robin (2002) analysis properly falls into this category of chance. However,
in the sorted economy the fortune of a good bargaining position is in part the residue of design.
Here, more skilled workers search more intensely which results not only in matches with more
productive firms, but also in better bargaining positions. This part we attribute to sorting, not luck.
Our results are consistent with those of Postel-Vinay and Robin (2002) in that a large portion of
wage variance is due to within-match bargaining position variation. However, allowing sorting
reveals that a significant part of it is correlated with worker skill which we classify as a sorting
contribution.
7.2 Wage regressions and sorting
In their seminal analysis of the distribution of wages, Abowd et al. (1999) pioneered what is now
the standard matched employer-employee log wage regression with additive worker and firm fixed
effects,
lnwin = χi + ϕJ(i,n) + ǫin, (25)
where i index individual workers, n index panel observations (typically, annual cross sections), and
J(i, n) indicates the identity of worker i’s employer in cross section n. Hence, χi is a worker fixed
39Recall that the log wage decompositions are based on (minimum mean square) predicted wages using (23). We
estimate separate linear relationships between lnw, h, p and q for the sorting and the no sorting economies. The
projection in the no sorting economy has a significantly higher residual term contribution to variance of about 55%
whereas it is only 20% in the estimated sorting economy.
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effect, ϕJ(i,n) is a firm fixed effect, and ǫin represents residual variation. In an actual application,
one would typically account for time-varying regressors at both the worker and the firm level. Here,
in line with the structural model, we consider the case where all heterogeneity is accounted for by
time-invariant worker and firm characteristics that can be subsumed into fixed effects. Abowd et al.
(1999) estimate variations and extensions of (25) on French data comparable to that later used by
Postel-Vinay and Robin (2002), and find that worker heterogeneity, as measured by variation in the
estimatedworker fixed effects, is the main driver of log wage variance, although firm effects are also
quantitatively important. These results contrast with the those of Postel-Vinay and Robin (2002),
who find a limited role for worker heterogeneity in shaping the distribution of wages.40
Table 6 presents the log wage variance decomposition obtained from the application of equation
(25) to our data as well as simulated data from the estimated model. In Table 6 we denote the
correlation between worker and firm fixed effects a “wage sorting effect”, not to be confused with
the equilibrium correlation between worker skills and firm productivity. The wage sorting effect
measures the extent to which high wage workers are matched with high wage firms as defined by
the equation (25) fixed effects.
The left two columns in Table 6 present the wage variance decomposition from equation (25)
applied to our data. Through this lens worker heterogeneity is the overwhelming contributor to log
wage variance: Worker heterogeneity accounts for almost 3/4 of all log wage variance with minor
contributions from firm heterogeneity and the residual, and in particular, almost no wage sorting
contribution. This is roughly in line with the empirical results presented in Abowd et al. (1999)
using French data, but contrasts sharply with our structural log wage variance decomposition where
we find sorting to be the single biggest contributor at 40% and worker heterogeneity to account for
less than 1/3 of log wage variation.
It is therefore notable that even without targeting these statistics in our estimation, simulated
data from our estimatedmodel reproduces theAbowd et al. (1999) logwage variance decomposition
quite well (right column in Table 6). In particular, worker heterogeneity is the dominant contributor
to variance and the sorting contribution is almost zero. Recall that the estimated model implies
a strong equilibrium correlation between worker skill h and firm productivity p at 0.37 with an
associated wage variance contribution of 40%. Still, looking at wage data only through the lens of
equation (25) we obtain a wage sorting effect of only 6%, which is quite close to its data counterpart.
40Postel-Vinay and Robin (2002) contend that their estimates of the contribution of worker heterogeneity to observed
wage variation are lower bounds.
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Table 6: Log wage variance decomposition—The Abowd et al. (1999) approach.
Data
Simulated data from
estimated model
Value
Percent of
Var(lnwin)
Value
Percent of
Var(lnwin)
Var(lnwin) 0.097 100% 0.107 100%
Worker effect, Var(χi) 0.070 72% 0.054 49%
Firm effect, Var(ϕJ(i,n)) 0.014 14% 0.023 22%
Residual effect, Var(ǫin) 0.015 16% 0.026 23%
Wage sorting, 2Cov(χi, ϕJ(i,t)) −0.002 −2% 0.007 6%
Hence, we find that a decomposition based on equation (25) significantly biases inference about
labor market sorting, and that it overestimates the importance of worker heterogeneity as a source
of wage dispersion.
Indeed, the wage equation in our estimated model is not monotone in worker skill and firm
productivity which produces negative bias in the wage sorting effect relative to the true sorting
contribution, as documented in Appendix C. Moreover, the fixed effects approach of Abowd et al.
(1999) is of course not well suited for dealing with the variability in bargaining position arising
through on-the-job search. We conjecture that the fixed effects regression of Abowd et al. (1999)
attributes the (sizable, see Table 5) within-firm bargaining position variation that correlates with
worker skill to the worker wage fixed effect, which is consequently inflated vis-a-vis the worker
heterogeneity contribution to the structural log wage variance decomposition in Table 5. Hence, a
high wage fixed effect in the Abowd et al. (1999) framework reflects both a high skill-level and a
greater ability to extract rent from matches.
7.2.1 Worker wage effect variance by firm type and ID
Our analysis considers sorting of the kind where workers and firms sort by their skill and productiv-
ity types. The equilibrium match distribution is estimated to be positively sorted with corr(h, p) =
0.37. By implication, the firm type conditional distribution of worker types varies systematically
by firm type. In particular, one would expect that the firm type conditional worker type variance be
lower than that of the overall worker type population.41 Thus, an implication of sorting is the result
41Eeckhout and Kircher (2011) make related arguments.
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Table 7: Worker wage effect sorting by firm type and ID.
Data Sim
Var(χi) 0.069 0.054
E[Var(χi | J(i) = j)] 0.051 0.051
E[Var(χi | ϕJ(i))] 0.065 0.053
that E[Var(h | p)] < Var(h). Indeed, for our estimated model we find that, E[Var(h | p)] = 0.012
while Var(h) = 0.015. The sorting of worker types to firm types induces a sorting of workers within
firm types such that there is less difference between workers within firm types than in the overall
population. Lopes de Melo (2016) captures this intuition by the correlation between a worker’s
type and that of his/her co-workers, as measured using Abowd et al. (1999)-type log wage worker
fixed effects.
While acknowledging that the wage regression in equation (25) is misspecified and that it is
unclear in exactly which way the misspecification biases the fixed effects relative to the underlying
worker and firm types, we will nevertheless point to a set of statistics from it that may provide some
insight about sorting and avenues for future research.
Consider the cross sectional variance of worker effects, Var(χi), reported in Table 7 to be 0.069
in the data and 0.054 in data simulated from the estimated model.42 In addition, Table 7 shows
the worker wage variance within firm and within firm wage fixed effect. We find that the within
firm variance, E[Var(χi|J(i) = j)], is 0.051 in both data and simulated data from the estimated
model. We calculate the firm wage fixed effect conditional variance, E[Var(χi|ϕJ(i))] by dividing
each cross section into equal size groups of firms with the same firm effects.43 In the data, we find
that E[Var(χi | ϕJ(i))] is 0.065, while the estimated model implies a within-firm effect variance of
0.053.44
As can be seen from Table 7, there is a substantial difference between E[Var(χi|J(i) = j)]
and E[Var(χi|ϕJ(i))] in the data that the model cannot replicate. In the model, all firms with the
same productivity have the same expected labor force composition. Thus, by design the model
42Note that Var(χi) differs slightly from Table 6. The samples differ slightly in that we do not include single worker
firms in Table 7.
43There are about 50,000 firms in a cross section. We order by firm wage fixed effect and divide into bins each with
50 firms. This procedure corresponds to a variable bandwidth estimator where bandwidth is proportional to the inverse
of firm fixed effect density.
44 For both data and estimate model, E[Var(χi|ϕJ(i))] is very close to the unconditional variance, Var(χi), leaving
little variance in E[χi] across firm wage effects, consistent with the almost zero wage sorting result.
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has E[Var(h | p)] = E[Var(hi | J(i) = j, p)]. ϕj is a noisy (and biased) estimate of pj but it
nevertheless introduces only a minor increase in worker wage effect variance within firm types
relative to within firms in the estimated model. A similar analysis, omitted here, can be done using
Lopes de Melo (2016)’s notion of worker-coworker correlations.
Conditional on firmwage effect, themodel explains the data well both in terms of the conditional
worker wage variance. This is reassuring in that the model is designed to explain sorting of workers
to firms based on the productivity type of the firm. The results demonstrate that sorting of workers
to firm productivity type explains a significant reduction ofworker type variance within firm relative
to the overall population. But the data are clearly suggestive that there is an additional source of
sorting of worker groups by firm ID. We conjecture this may reflect a labor market segmentation by
worker type. This is beyond the scope of this paper and is not central to its conclusions, but it does
suggest that analyses that are specifically directed towards the understanding of the composition of
teams within firms would be well advised to consider additional characteristics at the firm level that
workers coordinate sorting around.
8 Concluding remarks
A labor market addresses mismatch through worker reallocation. The greater the mismatch, the
greater the urgency of the reallocation. Indeed, empirical evidence documents that reallocation is
a common occurrence in most labor markets and that reallocation directly between jobs more often
than not are associated with wage increases. With an emphasis on mobility patterns in the data, this
paper quantifies the contribution of labor market heterogeneity to wage dispersion in a frictional
labor market setting where assortative matching may be present.
In the estimated model wage variation is decomposed into four sources: Worker heterogeneity
(30%), firm heterogeneity (20%), friction (10%), and sorting (40%). The match production func-
tion is estimated to be supermodular implying positive assortative matching. Through the model’s
wage determination mechanism it incentivizes more skilled workers to search more intensely to
reallocate to better firms. The correlation coefficient between worker skill and firm productivity is
0.37 in the steady state match distribution. A social planner can increase output net of search cost
by 1.4% which is obtained through higher overall search intensity, but slightly less sorting. In the
hypothetical where frictions are eliminated while holding job and worker populations constant, a
perfectly sorted economy increases output by 8.1%.
47
The identification strategy ranks firms by revealed preference through the fraction of a firm’s
hires that are poached directly from other firms as opposed to hired out of unemployment. We
term this the poaching rank. Based on the firm ranking identification is obtained using firm rank
conditional mobility and wage patterns. The model matches the data well.
We find that the estimated wage function is non-monotone in worker and firm types. Conse-
quently, we find significant bias in the wage variance decomposition based on the Abowd et al.
(1999) approach, which fails to detect any variance contribution from sorting and it attributes too
much importance to worker heterogeneity.
Our estimate implies a relatively modest variance contribution from frictional competition of
10%. This is substantially below comparable estimates in Postel-Vinay and Robin (2002) which
assumes no sorting. In fact we find comparable levels of wage dispersion that is attributable to
variation in bargaining position and as such our model is supportive of the conclusion that frictional
sources have a large impact on wage dispersion. But we find that a significant part of the bargaining
position variation in the model is related to search choice variation across different skill workers.
More skilled workers search harder and tend to have better bargaining positions. We attribute this
to the sorting effect and consequently find a significantly smaller role for pure chance.
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Appendix
A Match value characteristics, uniqueness and existence.
For a given worker type h and any p ∈ [0, 1], define the mapping,
V˜ (h, p) = max
s≥0,R≥0
{
f(h, p)− c(s) + λsβ ∫ 1
p
V˜ (h, p′)dΓ(p′) + [δ (p) + λδ0]V˜0(h)
+λδ0β
∫ 1
R
V˜ (h, p′)dΓ(p′)n(p)
}
r + δ (p) + λδ0 + λsβΓ̂ (p) + λδ0β [1− Γ(R)n(p)]
(26)
V˜0(h) = max
s≥0,R≥0
f(h, 0)− c(s) + λ(κs+ µ)β ∫ 1
R
V˜ (h, p′)dΓ(p′)
r + λ(κs+ µ)βΓ̂ (R)
. (27)
By Blackwell’s sufficient conditions, this is a contraction mapping in [V˜ (h, p) , V˜0(h)]. Thus, there
exists a unique fixed point for this mapping. It is straightforward to show that any fixed point of
the mapping in equations (2)-(3) must be a fixed point of that of (26)-(27), and vice versa. Hence,
there exists a unique solution to equation (2)-(3).
Define by F (h, V ) the distribution of match values in the vacancy pool for a type h worker. It
is defined by F (h, V ) =
∫ 1
0
1[V (h, p) ≤ V ]dΓ(p). By the envelope theorem, the derivative of the
match value with respect to p can be written as,(
r + δ(p) + λδ0 + λs(h, p)Γ̂(p)
)
Vp(h, p) = fp(h, p)− δp(p)[V (h, p)− V0(h)]−
δ0βnp(p)
∫ V (h,1)
R(h)
F (h, V )n(p) lnF (h, V )dV > 0,
where the inequality follows from δp ≤ 0 and np ≥ 0 and the presumption that thematch in question
is viable, that is V (h, p) ≥ V0(h). Hence, match value is monotonically increasing in p.
B Firm size
In steady state, the mass of productivity p firms with n workers mn(p) must be constant. Hence,
the steady state firm size distribution satisfies,
0 = η (p)mn−1 (p) + d (p) (n+ 1)mn+1 (p)− (η (p) + d (p)n)mn (p) , (28)
for all n ≥ 1 and p. The firm’s expected labor force composition is independent of its size. Hence,
the expected destruction rate of matches is d(p) for any firm size. Also, in steady state the number
of firm births (firms enter with one worker) must equal the number of deaths,
η(p)m0(p) = d(p)m1(p). (29)
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An alternative interpretation of equation (29) is that firms do not exit, but they just have no economic
activity during periods where they have no workers. During such periods they act like potential
entrants. In the estimation we do not use entry and exit information from the data, and so, we do
not have to take a stand on the issue. Furthermore, it is given that
∞∑
n=0
mn(p) = mφ(p), (30)
where φ(p) is the firm productivity distribution PDF. Equations (28)-(30) imply that the type con-
ditional firm size distributionmn(p)/(mφ(p)) is Poisson with arrival rate η(p)/d(p),
mn(p) =
(
η (p)
d (p)
)n
1
n!
exp
(
−η (p)
d (p)
)
mφ (p) , (31)
for all n ≥ 0.
C Wage regressions and monotonicity
Ignoring the role of observable covariates, and subsuming the constant term into, say, the firm
effect, Abowd et al. (1999) assume a log wage equation where worker and firm fixed effects enter
additively,
lnwin = χi + ϕJ(i,n) + ǫin, (32)
where J(i, n) is the firm ID that worker i is matched with at observation time n, and χi and ϕk are
the worker and firm fixed effects. The notation as in the main part of the paper, see the description
related to our auxiliary log wage regression (20) although here we allow for arbitrary correlation
between worker and firm effects. The identification of the fixed effects from matched employer-
employee data relies on this additive structure. Consider a class of models where workers differ
by skill and firms by productivity. An agent’s type is permanent. Furthermore, match output is
increasing in both skill and productivity. Can the estimated worker and firm fixed effects from the
log-linear wage equation be used as the basis for identification of the underlying worker skill and
firm productivity heterogeneity? In particular, does the correlation between the estimated worker
and firm fixed effects, corr(χ̂i, ϕ̂J(i,n)), identify sorting in the matching between worker skill and
firm productivity? Eeckhout and Kircher (2011) provide a negative answer for their model. We will
generally provide a negative answer as well. Both answers are based on the insight that for themodel
structures in question, the log additive wage equation is fundamentally misspecified with respect
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Figure 6: The correlation between wage fixed effects and true agent heterogeneity for given (ρ, β)
combinations.
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Note: The solid and dashed lines show cor[χˆ, h] and cor[ϕˆ, p], respectively. For the given model specification,
the production function scale parameter (f0) and the base offer arrival rate (λ) are set such that the the
steady state equilibrium solution satisfies u = 0.05 and E[w(h, p)] = 180.0. The dashed red line at ρ = 1
divides the model specifications with positive sorting for ρ < 1 and negative sorting for ρ > 1.
to the worker and firm heterogeneity contributions to wages. Specifically, wages are generally not
monotonically increasing in skill and productivity.
In Figures 6 and 7 we relate estimates of worker and firm fixed effects from the wage equation
(32) to the true underlying worker skill and firm productivity heterogeneity in simulations of steady
state equilibria for different (ρ, β) combinations.
Figure 6 shows corr(χ̂i, hi) and corr(ϕ̂k, pk). It is seen that the wage equation firm fixed effect is
strongly correlated with firm productivity regardless of the type and strength of sorting and worker’s
bargaining power. Not surprisingly, higher bargaining power increases the correlation.
The correlation between the wage equation worker fixed effect and worker skill is on the other
hand quite sensitive to the specification of the model. If sorting is positive and wage determination
is primarily set by wage posting, then the correlation is low. In this case, the wage profiles of
more skilled workers are characterized by substantial wage growth over an employment spell, and
consequently, the notion of a wage equation worker fixed effect is misplaced. As documented in
Figure 1 it is in this type of equilibrium also perfectly possible to observe more skilled workers
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receive lower wages than less skilled workers within a given firm. In such a case, the estimation
will tend to rank the less skilled worker with a higher fixed effect than the more skilled worker.
This mechanism is strengthened by the assumption that the wage equation has an i.i.d. over time
error process, ǫin and the fact that even for the high skilled workers, the wage process has some
permanence to it. Since the more skilled worker’s realized wage growth is often associated with an
actual job-to-job transition, the estimation will be allowed to explain the substantial observed wage
growth of the high skilled worker by increasing the wage equation fixed effect differential between
the two firms involved in the job-to-job transition, thereby laying a foundation for a negative bias
in the correlation between wage equation worker and firm fixed effects.
In the negative sorting case, low skilled workers are the ones taking temporary current wage hits
with the expectation of future gains. As a result, in this type of equilibriumwages are monotonically
increasing in worker skill within a given firm and the ranking of wage equation worker fixed effects
will be aligned with the skill ranking. This accounts for the strong positive correlation between the
estimated wage equation worker fixed effects and worker skill for the negative sorting cases, ρ > 1.
For higher β, where wage determination is to a greater extent set by bargaining rather than
posting, corr(χ̂i, hi) is higher because wages are moving towards being monotone in worker skill
and firm productivity.
Figure 7 presents the correlation between the wage equation fixed effects in relation to the corre-
lation between the skill and productivity indices in the equilibrium steady state match distribution.
The correlation between h and p based on G(h, p) reveals the basic property of the model that
sorting is positive for ρ < 1, negative for ρ > 1, and there is no sorting when ρ = 1. It is seen
that when β = 0.2 and there is negative sorting, the correlation between wage equation worker and
firm fixed effects, En[corr(χ̂i, ϕ̂J(i,n))] is very close to equilibrium steady state corr(h, p). This is
consistent with the results in Figure 7 that the estimated wage equation worker and firm fixed effects
are closely correlated with the skill and productivity indices in this case. When sorting is positive
and β = 0.2, we see that En[corr(χ̂i, ϕ̂J(i,n))] and corr(h, p) diverge. In this case, the worker fixed
effects are so poorly related to the skill ranking that the resulting negative bias drives the correlation
between χ and ϕ negative. As a result,En[corr(χ̂i, ϕ̂J(i,n))] is negative both when sorting is positive
and negative for this case.
In the case where β = 0.5, the fixed effects correlation En[corr(χ̂i, ϕ̂J(i,n))] does quite well in
capturing the steady state match correlation between skill and productivity. There is some negative
bias in the positive sorting case, but in this case, the correlation coefficients share the same signs.
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Figure 7: The correlation between skill and productivity for given (ρ, β) combinations.
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Note: The solid line is cor[h, p]. The dashed line is cor[χi, ϕK(i,n)]. The wage equation fixed effects are esti-
mated on simulated data from the given steady state equilibrium. For the given model specification, the
production function scale parameter (f0) and the base offer arrival rate (λ) are set such that the the steady
state equilibrium solution satisfies u = 0.05 and E[w(h, p)] = 180.0. The dashed red line at ρ = 1
divides the model specifications with positive sorting for ρ < 1 and negative sorting for ρ > 1.
The above results suggest that an observed positive value of En[corr(χ̂i, ϕ̂J(i,n))] indicates that
sorting between skill and productivity is positive. In general, the correlation coefficient between
h and p is always greater than En[corr(χ̂i, ϕ̂J(i,n))]. It is also worth emphasizing that the often
observed small and negative correlation between χ and ϕ is consistent with anything from mild
negative sorting to strong positive sorting between h and p.
D The wage equation
As described in section 2.8, equations (1), (2), and (4) determine the wage function w(h, q, p)
describing the wage offered to a type-hworker by a type-p firm competing for the worker’s services
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with a firm of type q ≤ p. The wage equation takes the form
w − c(s(h, p)) = β
[
f(h, p)− c(s(h, p))
]
+ (1− β)∆(p, q)
[
f(h, q)− c(s(h, q))
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Net of search cost output sharing
−
[
λs(h, p)(1− β)
∫ p
q
Vp(h, p
′)Γˆ(p′)dp′︸ ︷︷ ︸
Offer matching, within-firm
+ (1− β)λs(h, p)β
∫ 1
p
Vp(h, p
′)Γˆ(p′)dp′︸ ︷︷ ︸
Offer matching, between-firm
]
+λs(h, q)(1− β)∆(p, q)β
∫ 1
q
Vp(h, p
′)Γˆ(p′)dp′︸ ︷︷ ︸
Offer matching, outside option firm
+(1− β)
[
∆(p, q)δ(q)− δ(p)
]
V0(h)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Layoff rate heterogeneity (direct effect)
+(1− β)λδ0β
∫ 1
R(h)
Vp(h, p
′)
{
∆(p, q)
[
1− Γ(p′)n(q)]− [1− Γ(p′)n(p)]}︸ ︷︷ ︸
Advance notice shock heterogeneity (direct effect)
, (33)
where∆(p, q) := [r+ δ(p) + λδ0][r+ δ(q) + λδ0]−1 < 1 reflects that income flows are discounted
differently in type-p and type-q matches due to layoff rate differences.
Wages net of search costs reflect the sharing of match output net of search cost, f(h, p) −
c(s(h, p)) given the worker’s appropriately discounted outside option of employment in the type-q
firm, with adjustments for differences in expected future wage trajectories between the type-p and
the type-q firms in relation to climbing the productivity ladder, advance notice shocks, and layoff
shocks.
First, the term labeled “Offer matching, within-firm” reflects the more productive type-p em-
ployers ability to match outside offers, generating within-job wage growth. Second, the term “Offer
matching, between-firm” reflects that the more productive type-p firm acts as a better outside op-
tion in future wage negotiations with even more productive firm types. Notice that the within- and
between-firm offer matching terms are negative: More productive firms offer more rewarding fu-
ture wage trajectories and use this to depress current wages while remaining competitive vis-a-vis
the less productive type-q firm.
Second, while the type-pfirm is better able tomatch future offers, future offers arrive faster in the
type-q firm due to s(h, q) ≥ s(h, p). A type-hworker negotiating a contract with a type-p firm using
a type-q firm as outside option understands this and must be compensated for giving up the faster
arrival of outside offers at the type-q firm. This limits the ability of the type-p firm backload wages
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while remaining competive in hiring and retention. The term labeled “Offer matching, outside
option firm” captures this effect. Notice that this term is positive. Further notice that offer matching
at the outside firm has wage implications only because of job offer arrival rate heterogeneity.
Third, the term labeled “Layoff rate heterogeneity (direct effect)” captures that jobs in less pro-
ductive firms are less secure. The larger the difference between δ(q), appropriately weighted to with
the relative discount rate∆(p, q), and δ(p), the more weight is put on the value of unemployment in
the wage setting procedure. Layoff rate heterogeneity also has indirect wage effects running through
workers’ job search behavior and the value of climbing the productivity ladder. Lower layoff rates
at the top of the productivity ladder increases the value of jobs at the top rungs, enabling top-rung
firms to depress the wage they offer while retaining the ability to hire workers from less productive
firms.
Fourth, the term labeled “Advance notice shock heterogeneity (direct effect)” comprises the
(direct) wage effects arising from the fact that the distribution from which an alternative job offer
is drawn is better (in the sense of stochastic dominance) in the more productive type-p firm. This
allows the more productive type-p firm to lower the wage while remaining competitive vis-a-vis the
less productive type-q firm. That is, the direct effect of advance notice shocks is negative. Of course,
advance notice shock heterogeneity also has indirect effects operating through job search. Indeed,
advance notice shock heterogeneity alters the returns to climbing the productivity ladder, and the
wage effects of this depends on the n(p)-profile, i.e. how the sampling distribution associated with
an advance notice shock varies across the productivity ladder.
Our wage equation (33) has a number of interesting special cases. First, for β = 1, w = f(h, p).
In this case the worker appropriates the entire match value and wages simply reflect the match
productivity.45 An identical wage implication arises if q = p, i.e. when the worker has achieved
full surplus extraction at the current employer. Second, consider the case where there is no advance
notice shock heterogeneity, i.e. n(p) = 1 for all p, no layoff rate heterogeneity, δ(p) = δ for all p,
and where search intensity is independent of worker skill h and firm productivity p, i.e. s(h, p) = s
for all h, p. This environment does not feature sorting, and was studied by Postel-Vinay and Robin
(2002) and Cahuc et al. (2006). Under these restrictions, it is straightforward to show that
w = βf(h, p) + (1− β)f(h, q)− (1− β)2λs
∫ p
q
fp(h, p
′)Γˆ(p′)dp′
r + δ + δ0λ+ βλsΓˆ(p′)
45The case β = 0 is of little interest when search intensity is endogenous as it leaves workers with no incentives to
search.
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where the wage offered to a type-h worker by a type-p firm in competition with a less productive
type-q firm reflects output sharing adjusted with an inter-temporal transfer accounting for the ability
of the type-p firm to match future offers in the rangep′ ∈ (q, p]. Furthermore, if match output is
multiplicatively separable in h and p, wages are proportional to the worker skill component. This
result does not carry over to the case of endogenous search intensities, where worker skill level h
enters indirectly the through the search intensity choice.
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E Weighting matrix used in main estimation
Table 8: Diagonal elements of weight matrix used in main estimation
Moment
value
Diagonal
element
Moment
value
Diagonal
element
1 E[ϕ] 5.238 0.091 29 ϑEE1 (1) 0.155 1.062
2 sd[ϕ] 0.179 2.665 30 ϑEE1 (2) 0.145 0.531
3 sd[χ] 0.218 2.180 31 ϑEE1 (3) 0.132 0.531
4 sd[ǫ] 0.134 3.543 32 ϑEE1 (4) 0.120 0.531
5 E[wit | (i, t) ∈ F 0] 5.095 0.012 33 ϑEE1 (5) 0.123 0.531
6 sd[wit | (i, t) ∈ F 0] 0.287 0.207 34 ϑEE1 (6) 0.114 0.531
7 E[wit | (i, t) ∈ F̂ 0] 5.192 0.011 35 ϑEE1 (7) 0.108 0.531
8 sd[wit | (i, t) ∈ F̂ 0] 0.308 0.193 36 ϑEE1 (8) 0.093 0.531
9 E[∆wit | j(i, t) = j(i, t− 1)] 0.011 5.276 37 ϑEE1 (9) 0.077 0.531
10 w/w 1.854 0.032 38 ϑEE1 (10) 0.052 1.062
11 E[dEUiτ = 1 | τ ≥ 0] 0.338 0.176 39 ϑEE7 (1) 0.043 1.062
12 E[τ 0i | (i, t) ∈ F̂ 0] 1.054 0.056 40 ϑEE7 (2) 0.043 0.531
13 sd[τ 0i | (i, t) ∈ F̂ 0] 1.263 0.047 41 ϑEE7 (3) 0.049 0.531
14 corr(τ 0i , wit | (i, t) ∈ F̂ 0) −0.186 0.639 42 ϑEE7 (4) 0.045 0.531
15 Avg. jobs per emp. spell 2.192 0.027 43 ϑEE7 (5) 0.047 0.531
16 Std. dev. job per emp. spell 1.551 0.038 44 ϑEE7 (6) 0.050 0.531
17 Unemployment rate 0.218 0.183 45 ϑEE7 (7) 0.048 0.531
18 E[ιd | ιo = 1] 4.714 0.192 46 ϑEE7 (8) 0.037 0.531
19 E[ιd | ιo = 2] 5.378 0.096 47 ϑEE7 (9) 0.037 0.531
20 E[ιd | ιo = 3] 5.887 0.096 48 ϑEE7 (10) 0.033 1.062
21 E[ιd | ιo = 4] 5.937 0.096 49 ϑEU1 (1) 0.107 1.062
22 E[ιd | ιo = 5] 5.989 0.096 50 ϑEU1 (2) 0.079 0.531
23 E[ιd | ιo = 6] 6.360 0.096 51 ϑEU1 (3) 0.063 0.531
24 E[ιd | ιo = 7] 6.496 0.096 52 ϑEU1 (4) 0.053 0.531
25 E[ιd | ιo = 8] 6.568 0.096 53 ϑEU1 (5) 0.050 0.531
26 E[ιd | ιo = 9] 6.770 0.096 54 ϑEU1 (6) 0.041 0.531
27 E[ιd | ιo = 10] 7.915 0.192 55 ϑEU1 (7) 0.037 0.531
56 ϑEU1 (8) 0.032 0.531
57 ϑEU1 (9) 0.024 0.531
58 ϑEU1 (10) 0.014 1.062
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F Efficiently weighted estimate
Here we present the efficiently weighted estimate. We obtain the variance-covariance matrix of
the auxiliary model statistics through bootstrap of worker histories with resampling. The weighting
matrix is the inverse of the variance-covariancematrix. We provide the parameter estimates without
estimated errors.
Table 9: Structural parameter estimates (efficiently weighted).
Structural parameter Estimate Structural parameter Estimate
Top layoff rate δ(1) 0.011
(0.0001)
Φ(p) = Beta(βΦ0 , β
Φ
1 )
Bottom layoff rate, δ(0) 0.585
(0.0005)
βΦ0 0.195
(0.0004)
δ(p) curvature, ς 1.629
(0.001)
βΦ1 6.972
(0.001)
Search cost function
(c0(s−s))1+1/c1
1+1/c1
Ψ(h) = Beta(βΨ0 , β
Ψ
1 )
Free search, s 0.003
(0.0003)
βΨ0 0.252
(0.0004)
c0 3.318
(0.001)
βΨ1 2.329
(0.001)
c1 0.647
(0.0005)
f(h, p) =
f0
(
αhρ + (1− α)pρ
)1/ρ
Recruitment cost function
cν(ν) =
ν1+1/cν1
1+1/cν1
ρ −7.563
(0.001)
cν1 0.005
(0.0003)
α 0.436
(0.0005)
Unemployed search efficiency, κ 0.590
(0.0004)
f0 1492.961
(0.005)
Advance notice shock, δ0 0.084
(0.0002)
Workers’ bargaining power, β 0.352
(0.0004)
Draws at top firm, n(1) 2.095
(0.001)
Std. dev., wage measurement
error, σw
0.010
(0.004)
n(p) curvature, ς0 19.652
(0.003)
Note: All rates at annual frequency. Standard errors in parentheses.
The fit is given in Table 10. As can be seen, the sorting moments are matched less well and
point to less sorting, which is indeed born out in a steady state distribution correlation between h
and p of 0.19. Given the focus on the mobility part of the model, we chose to given additional
weight to these moments in the main estimate. As mentioned it is however a useful illustration that
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Table 10: Model fit
Moment Data Model Moment Data Model Moment Data Model
1 E[ϕ] 5.238
(0.0004)
5.238 18 E[ιd | ιo = 1] 4.714
(0.0163)
6.069 38 ϑEE7 (1) 0.043
(0.0013)
0.095
2 sd[ϕ] 0.179
(0.0003)
0.192 19 E[ιd | ιo = 2] 5.378
(0.0163)
6.388 39 ϑEE7 (2) 0.043
(0.0011)
0.072
3 sd[χ] 0.218
(0.0003)
0.194 20 E[ιd | ιo = 3] 5.887
(0.0142)
6.530 40 ϑEE7 (3) 0.049
(0.0010)
0.062
4 sd[ǫ] 0.134
(0.0001)
0.142 21 E[ιd | ιo = 4] 5.937
(0.0155)
6.603 41 ϑEE7 (4) 0.045
(0.0011)
0.055
5 E[wit | (i, t) ∈ F 0] 5.095
(0.0006)
4.963 22 E[ιd | ιo = 5] 5.989
(0.0148)
6.672 42 ϑEE7 (5) 0.047
(0.0012)
0.046
6 sd[wit | (i, t) ∈ F 0] 0.287
(0.0005)
0.213 23 E[ιd | ιo = 6] 6.360
(0.0137)
6.699 43 ϑEE7 (6) 0.050
(0.0011)
0.041
7 E[wit | (i, t) ∈ F̂ 0] 5.192
(0.0095)
5.112 24 E[ιd | ιo = 7] 6.496
(0.0156)
6.687 44 ϑEE7 (7) 0.048
(0.0011)
0.037
8 sd[wit | (i, t) ∈ F̂ 0] 0.308
(0.0083)
0.218 25 E[ιd | ιo = 8] 6.568
(0.0153)
6.688 45 ϑEE7 (8) 0.037
(0.0009)
0.035
9 E[∆wit | j(i, t) = j(i, t− 1)] 0.011
(0.0001)
0.013 26 E[ιd | ιo = 9] 6.770
(0.0148)
6.631 46 ϑEE7 (9) 0.037
(0.0009)
0.032
10 w/w 1.854
(0.0011)
1.800 27 E[ιd | ιo = 10] 7.915
(0.0148)
6.600 47 ϑEE7 (10) 0.033
(0.0009)
0.030
11 E[dEUiτ = 1 | τ ≥ 0] 0.338
(0.0008)
0.396 28 ϑEE1 (1) 0.155
(0.0013)
0.130 48 ϑEU1 (1) 0.107
(0.0011)
0.086
12 E[τ 0i | (i, t) ∈ F̂ 0] 1.054
(0.0405)
1.563 29 ϑEE1 (2) 0.145
(0.0012)
0.096 49 ϑEU1 (2) 0.079
(0.0010)
0.066
13 sd[τ 0i | (i, t) ∈ F̂ 0] 1.263
(0.0829)
1.396 30 ϑEE1 (3) 0.132
(0.0010)
0.081 50 ϑEU1 (3) 0.063
(0.0008)
0.056
14 corr(τ 0i , wit | (i, t) ∈ F̂ 0) −0.186
(0.0316)
−0.073 31 ϑEE1 (4) 0.120
(0.0011)
0.072 51 ϑEU1 (4) 0.053
(0.0008)
0.050
15 Avg. jobs per emp. spell 2.192
(0.0022)
2.299 32 ϑEE1 (5) 0.123
(0.0012)
0.059 52 ϑEU1 (5) 0.050
(0.0008)
0.041
16 Std. dev. job per emp. spell 1.551
(0.0036)
1.439 33 ϑEE1 (6) 0.114
(0.0011)
0.051 53 ϑEU1 (6) 0.041
(0.0007)
0.035
17 Unemployment rate 0.218
(0.0004)
0.239 34 ϑEE1 (7) 0.108
(0.0012)
0.045 54 ϑEU1 (7) 0.037
(0.0007)
0.029
35 ϑEE1 (8) 0.093
(0.0010)
0.042 55 ϑEU1 (8) 0.032
(0.0006)
0.025
36 ϑEE1 (9) 0.077
(0.0009)
0.037 56 ϑEU1 (9) 0.024
(0.0005)
0.023
37 ϑEE1 (10) 0.052
(0.0007)
0.033 57 ϑEU1 (10) 0.014
(0.0004)
0.020
Note: Standard errors in parentheses (computed by bootstrap). Hazard rates (moments 28-57) are quarterly.
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the sorting related statistics do indeed vary as expected with the degree of sorting in the model.
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